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INTRODUCTION 
On November 24, 2015, the St. Louis County Prosecutor, Robert McCul-
loch, announced that a grand jury did not return a true bill and issue an indictment 
against Officer Darren Wilson1 for the fatal shooting of Michael Brown.2 While 
the nation was holding its breath awaiting the grand jury’s decision, law enforce-
ment stood “deployed” around Ferguson. Missouri Governor Jay Nixon had de-
clared a state of emergency, and Ferguson Mayor James Knowles warned au-
thorities to “prepare for the worst.”3 St. Louis Police Chief Sam Dotson stated 
before the announcement, “We’ve had three months to prepare. . . . Our intelli-
gence is good. Our tactics are good,”4 a statement reminiscent of a general rally-
ing his soldiers before the final push to engage and destroy the enemy. The events 
                                                        
*  Arthur Rizer is an Associate Professor of Law at the West Virginia University College of 
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2014. Rizer is also a former criminal prosecutor with the U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal 
Division. Before his practice, Rizer served as a civilian police officer in Washington State. 
This article began as a paper for a course taken with Professor Cohen in 2008 at Georgetown 
University Law Center dealing with updating the Posse Comitatus Act for a post-9/11 world. 
The author would like to thank his research assistants Berkeley Bentley, Vito Minutelli, 
and Cody Murphey for their help in the research and editing of this article, and Instructor in 
Constitutional Law Dr. Joseph Hartman for his help to the author in drafting much of what 
became the introduction to this article and Part III.B.4. The author would like to thank the 
editors and staff of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas Nevada Law Journal for their effort 
in editing this article. The author would also like to thank the Hodges Faculty Research Grant 
for its support of this project. 
1  Police officer for the Ferguson, Missouri police department. Eyder Peralta & Krishnadev 
Calamur, Ferguson Documents: How the Grand Jury Reached a Decision, NPR (Nov. 25, 
2014, 6:41 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/11/25/366507379/ferguson-
docs-how-the-grand-jury-reached-a-decision. 
2  Id. 
3  Jamelle Bouie, Prepare for the Worst: Missouri’s Governor Smears the Residents of Fergu-
son and Misunderstands the Cause of Last Summer’s Chaos, SLATE (Nov. 19, 2014, 10:56 
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/11/ferguson_state_of_e 
mergency_gov_jay_nixon_expects_unrest_and_chaos_after.html [https://perma.cc/GQD8-Q 
K3H]. 
4  Evan Perez et al., Grand Jury Decision on Ferguson Officer Darren Wilson Could Come 
Friday, CNN (Nov. 19 2014, 8:21 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/19/justice/ferguson-
grand-jury-ruling [https://perma.cc/Y3QL-27UA]. 
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in Ferguson, Missouri—a city with a population of just over 20,0005—have 
brought into national focus a problem that many citizens across the United States 
have felt growing for years.6 Much as the media coverage of Selma brought the 
true plight of those fighting the Civil Rights Movement to the attention of the 
American and international public,7 the live coverage of the police response in 
Ferguson showed Americans and the world the extent of the militarization of 
state and local police departments in the United States.8  
The central problem posed by this shift toward militarization stems from the 
distinction between the role and purpose of a police officer and the role and pur-
pose of a soldier. Police officers swear “to protect and serve” the citizens of their 
communities; soldiers pledge to engage the enemy.9 No matter how well trained 
a police officer is to protect and serve, if the officer is “dressed like a soldier[], 
armed like [a] soldier[], and trained” in military tactics, there arises a very real 
concern that he or she will eventually begin to act like a soldier.10  
In 1971, psychologist Philip Zimbardo conducted the Stanford prison exper-
iment, in which he assigned subjects the role of either guard or prisoner.11 He 
wanted to determine if there was a tendency to slip into predefined roles based 
on the students’ expectations for their roles.12 Despite knowing that they were 
role-playing, almost all of the students began to act according to their prescribed 
                                                        
5  Ferguson, Missouri, CITY-DATA, http://www.city-data.com/city/Ferguson-Missouri.html#b 
[https://perma.cc/AP5M-V388] (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
6  See Arthur Rizer & Joseph Hartman, How the War on Terror Has Militarized the Police, 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/11/how-the-
war-on-terror-has-militarized-the-police/248047 [https://perma.cc/A7TL-PHAQ]. This prob-
lem of militarization of the police has grown over time because of the link between 9/11, the 
wars on terror and drugs, and the rapid and substantial increase in military hardware and wea-
ponry being placed in the hands of local police departments. See id. 
7  See Jack Nelson, The Civil Rights Movement: A Press Perspective, 28 HUM. RTS. 3, 5 (2001) 
(“[T]he extensive coverage that national newspapers gave to Selma and Birmingham, com-
bined with the increasingly powerful influence of television news, mobilized public opinion 
that pressured Congress to pass the landmark civil rights acts of 1964 and 1965.”). 
8  See, e.g., Has the Media Become a Third Force in Ferguson?, TECHSUM (Aug. 19, 2014), 
http://www.itechsum.com/mashable/item/100106-has-the-media-become-a-third-force-in-
ferguson [https://perma.cc/2FKM-FCQR] (“[S]tunning photos and videos emerging from Fer-
guson have helped to ignite debates about police brutality, the militarization of local authori-
ties and a range of issues concerning race, class and the U.S. justice system.”). 
9  See Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6. 
10  Id. 
11  Martyn Shuttleworth, Stanford Prison Experiment, EXPLORABLE (June 22, 2008), https://ex 
plorable.com/stanford-prison-experiment [https://perma.cc/3B5P-PL3B]. 
12  Id. 
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roles.13 The actions of the “guards” quickly came to include enforcing authori-
tarian measures and conducting psychological torture.14 The experiment was 
stopped early due to its shocking results and stands for the principle that roles 
can define behavior.15 Here, that principle translates to the idea that if you give 
a peace officer the dress of a soldier, the weapons of a soldier, the armored vehi-
cles of a soldier, and the training of a soldier, then that peace officer may come 
to define his role not as the peace officer he was hired to be, but as a soldier at 
war in his own community. 
The recent events in Ferguson have given prominence to a problem that has 
received little meaningful attention nationally. The attention police militarization 
did receive before Ferguson was characterized largely by local anecdote.16 Fer-
guson brought the rise in the militarization of American police forces to the fore-
front of the national conversation.17 The public witnessed the problem live on all 
the major news networks: a small, local police force, equipped with late genera-
tion, military-grade weaponry and training, treating the community it serves as 
an occupied territory in wartime.18 It is hardly surprising that the community re-
sponded forcefully. It is especially unsurprising given the complicated and sen-
sitive racial issues surrounding the killing of Michael Brown, with what appeared 
to be a wildly disproportionate police response followed by no repercussions for 
the officer. These events only added fuel to the fire.  
Would the nightly protests and riots that gripped the nation’s attention in 
Ferguson have escalated to such a crescendo had the initial police reaction not 
been so, well, militaristic? Would the protesters have reacted to “beat cops” they 
had seen walking their neighborhoods as they did to ranks of heavily-armed, flak-
jacketed, camouflage-uniformed police standing atop and around armored per-
sonnel carriers with mounted machine guns? To land on the topic at hand, is the 
militarization of the police spotlighted in Ferguson a result of the Posse Comita-
tus Act’s ban on using soldiers in domestic operations? Or, in the alternative, has 
America’s law enforcement community simply sidestepped that Act by turning 
peace officers into soldiers? Should the Posse Comitatus Act be reevaluated and 
                                                        
13  Id. (“Zimbardo tried to show that prison guards and convicts would tend to slip into prede-
fined roles, behaving in a way that they thought was required, rather than using their own 
judgment and morals. Zimbardo was trying to show what happened when all of the individu-
ality and dignity was stripped away from a human, and their life was completely controlled. 
He wanted to show the dehumanization and loosening of social and moral values that can 
happen to guards immersed in such a situation.”). 
14  Id. (“The prisoners began to suffer a wide array of humiliations and punishments at the 
hands of the guards, and many began to show signs of mental and emotional distress.”). 
15  Id. 
16  See RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S 
POLICE FORCES 241–60 (2013). 
17  See Justin Glawe, Michael Brown’s Hometown Is Under Occupation, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 
12, 2014, 8:35 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/12/michael-brown-s-
hometown-is-under-occupation.html [https://perma.cc/37TF-9YF6]. 
18  Id. 
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rewritten to take into account these ground truths? Is the Act outdated, unneces-
sary, and merely a hindrance in America today? Did the response to Hurricane 
Katrina and, especially, the horrors of September 11th reveal that we do some-
times need soldiers on our streets?  
This article will attempt to answer these questions. Part I will examine the 
development of Posse Comitatus and its relationship to the historical backdrop 
of the American philosophy of limited government. In essence, this part will ex-
plore where the Act came from and how it relates to the American experience. 
Part II of this article will explain the legal succession of Posse Comitatus from a 
political philosophy to a codified law. It will also cover the “sister” laws and 
exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act. Part III will address the merits of keeping 
the Posse Comitatus Act, as well as exploring arguments to repeal the Act in its 
entirety. Part IV turns its attention to the Posse Comitatus Act itself, specifically 
addressing whether this nineteenth century law has a place among twenty-first 
century threats when officials are simply bypassing the spirit of the law by de-
veloping soldiering police forces. This Part will also examine these threats to 
security if the status quo is kept and compare this to the potential danger to per-
sonal freedoms if the law is repealed. In addition, Part IV will tender a hybrid 
approach to the “repeal or maintain” argument. Specifically, this article will ar-
gue that the Posse Comitatus Act, as drafted in 1878, is outdated and ill-equipped 
to address modern day threats and military capacities. 
However, a case can always be made that we need to trade some freedoms 
for more security. Therefore, while the basic precept of separation of U.S. mili-
tary personnel from U.S. civilians is still sound policy, it must be recognized that 
tough times call for tough solutions; thus, instead of repealing the Posse Comi-
tatus Act, this Article proffers a redrafting of the Act. Moreover, the adage, 
“when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail,” rings true with 
today’s police departments. We train and want our law enforcement officials to 
be “peace officers,” not soldiers, yet sometimes the mission requires the blunt 
force of the dispassionate hammer. This Article argues that when we need direct 
action forces to be that hammer, we should simply use the military to “hit” the 
nail rather than blurring the line between what it means to be a police officer and 
what it means to be a soldier. 
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I. THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT19 
America was born of a violent revolution against an oppressive regime and 
occupying power, which left its enduring imprint on American philosophy.20 The 
American Revolution especially impacted the way this country’s citizens, as a 
whole, distrust their government.21 Indeed, the American gun culture, the “sepa-
rate but equal” branches of government, and the loosely regulated business mar-
kets all have roots in our deep-seated suspicion of the “crown”22—so too does 
the legal concept behind Posse Comitatus. 
September 11, 2001, changed the face of America—particularly the roles 
and responsibilities of local police officers and the military.23 The aftermath of 
9/11 and the government’s response to 9/11 caused many Americans to become 
nervous about the balance between the government’s mission to protect the citi-
zenry and the very essence of civil liberties.24 Nearly four years after 9/11, on 
August 29, 2005, America again faced the dilemma of giving up freedoms for 
protection. This time, however, the protection being sought was not from a clan-
destine terrorist sect, but rather from Mother Nature. Both 9/11 and Hurricane 
                                                        
19  Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012). “Whoever . . . 
willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to 
execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” 
Id. The Posse Comitatus Act (the “Act”) originally prohibited the expenditure of federal mon-
ies to use troops as a posse comitatus to execute the laws. Gary Felicetti & John Luce, The 
Posse Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight on 124 Years of Mischief and Misunder-
standing Before Any More Damage Is Done, 175 MIL. L. REV. 86, 90–91 (2003). By amend-
ment, that funding limit was replaced by the criminal penalties of a fine and imprisonment. Id. 
at 91. Litigation involving the Act, however, has focused almost solely on which armed forces 
are covered under the Act’s prohibition and how to define “execute the laws,” leaving the 
Act’s other elements largely unaddressed. Id. A 2010 New Mexico case held that a defendant 
charged with drug trafficking was not entitled to any relief even if the Air Force’s investigation 
of him violated the Act. See State v. Gonzales, 247 P.3d 1111 (N.M. Ct. App., Sept. 28, 2010). 
20  See generally infra Part III.A.2. 
21  See id. 
22  See id. 
23  The United States Military is no longer America’s primary means of defense; it is now a 
primary fighting force whose ranks are filled with battle-hardened warriors. So, too, has the 
mission of police officers changed: the friendly community peace officer is gone; he is re-
placed by para-military, SWAT-trained cops armed with assault rifles, night vision, and gas 
masks. See infra Part III.A.1. 
24  Dan Bennett, Comment, The Domestic Role of the Military in America: Why Modifying or 
Repealing the Posse Comitatus Act Would Be a Mistake, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 935, 935 
(2006) (stating that shortly after 9/11, “many long-held beliefs about the proper balance be-
tween civil liberties and the role of the government in protecting its citizens have been called 
into question.”). Benjamin Franklin once said, “Those who would give up essential Liberty, 
to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” Pennsylvania As-
sembly: Reply to the Governor (Nov. 11, 1755), in 6 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 238, 
242 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1963). Fortunately for Revolution, Mr. Franklin made this state-
ment in a time before briefcase bombs and planes flying into buildings. The truth is that we 
live in a world where we must balance the freedoms that make us who we are against the very 
survival of our people. After all, the exercise of our liberties depends upon us being alive to 
exercise them. 
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Katrina called into question the practicality and the wisdom of the Posse Comi-
tatus Act.25 This is ostensibly because Posse Comitatus limited the federal gov-
ernment’s ability to use its full spectrum of power to respond to the catastrophes 
quickly and effectively.26 
To understand where the country should go with regards to the Posse Comi-
tatus Act, it is necessary to understand where the country has been. This section 
will examine the history of Posse Comitatus, exploring its purpose and roots in 
American traditions. Next, this section will analyze the Posse Comitatus Act it-
self. Finally, this section will present the “sister” laws and the exceptions to Posse 
Comitatus and how the laws interact to make up the entire body of Posse Comi-
tatus jurisprudence. 
A. The History of Posse Comitatus 
1. The Roots of the Act 
The Latin phrase “Posse Comitatus” literally translates to “power of the 
county” or county force.27 It represents the power of a sheriff to keep the peace 
by calling together a group of citizens to act in a law enforcement capacity.28 In 
American law, the phrase simply refers to the principle that the federal military 
shall not be used in calling together a “posse.”29  
The debate in this country over whether the military should be used in do-
mestic law enforcement does not date back to the revolutionary period.30 The 
argument during the founding of the country was not over whether posse comi-
tatus would be allowed, but whether a standing army should be allowed.31 “Anti-
Federalists believed granting a newly formed federal legislature power to raise 
and support armies in peacetime and wartime could destroy the people’s liberty. 
                                                        
25  John R. Longley III, Military Purpose Act: An Alternative to the Posse Comitatus Act—
Accomplishing Congress’s Intent with Clear Statutory Language, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 718 
(2007) (“With the events of September 11, the continued threat of domestic terrorism, the 
national debate on border security, and the problem-plagued response to Hurricane Katrina, 
critics of the PCA [Posse Comitatus Act] argue that by failing to provide clear guidance for 
domestic military use the Act is detrimental to national security.”). 
26  See Bennett, supra note 24. 
27  Posse Comitatus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 3869 (8th ed. 2004). 
28  Id. 
29  Posse Comitatus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1183 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “posse comita-
tus” as “[a] group of citizens who are called together to assist the sheriff in keeping the 
peace.—Often shortened to posse”); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 32 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (stating that the Posse Comitatus Act “forbids the use of military troops as a posse 
comitatus”). 
30  Bennett, supra note 24, at 941. 
31  Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 481 
(2002). In fact, a sheriff’s power to call up the “able-bodied men to form a posse was an es-
tablished feature of the common law” at the time of the American Revolution. Felicetti & 
Luce, supra note 19, at 95. A common law posse comitatus, though, “followed the direction 
of the local sheriff,” not a federal authority. Id. at 96. 
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Consequently, there ‘was a significant citizen sentiment against the mere pres-
ence of standing armies, particularly in peacetime.’ ”32 Citizen sentiment was 
such that the Declaration of Independence specifically addressed the issue, de-
claring that the crown “has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies 
without the Consent of our legislatures.”33  
Many of the original states were gravely concerned that a standing army 
would pose a threat to their continued freedom, as evidenced in their respective 
state constitutions.34 For example, both North Carolina’s and Pennsylvania’s 
constitutions decree that “standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to lib-
erty, [and] they ought not to be kept up.”35 The states of Delaware, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire went further, declaring that “standing ar-
mies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up without the 
consent of the legislature.”36 At the national level, the Third Amendment’s “pro-
hibition against compelled quartering of soldiers during peacetime stands as a 
monument to the fear of standing armies.”37  
While the fear of standing armies was widespread in the early days of the 
Union, “the use of a Posse Comitatus was not expressly disavowed in the found-
ing era.”38 Indeed, Alexander Hamilton, while arguing against the Anti-Federal-
ist movement, proffered the position that the soon-to-be-ratified Constitution 
supported the use of Posse Comitatus.39 Hamilton summarized his opponents’ 
arguments as follows: 
It being therefore evident that the supposition of a want of power to require the 
aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of color, it will follow that 
the conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its application to the authority of 
the federal government over the militia is as uncandid as it is illogical.40 
Hamilton based his argument on “the right of Congress to pass all laws nec-
essary and proper to execute its declared powers [to] include the assistance of 
                                                        
32  Christopher J. Schmidt & David A. Klinger, Altering the Posse Comitatus Act: Letting the 
Military Address Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Soil, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 667, 688 (2006) (quot-
ing Christopher J. Schmidt, Could a CIA or FBI Agent Be Quartered in Your House During a 
War on Terrorism, Iraq or North Korea?, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 587, 651 (2004) [hereinafter 
Quartered in Your House]). 
33  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 13 (U.S. 1776). 
34  Schmidt & Klinger, supra note 32, at 688. 
35  Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
36  Id. 
37  Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any 
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed 
by law.”)). 
38  Id. (citing Felicetti & Luce, supra note 31, at 95). 
39  THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 182 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“In 
order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to execute the Laws of the 
Union, it has been remarked that there is no where any provision in the proposed Constitution 
for calling out the POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty; 
whence it has been inferred that military force was intended to be his only auxiliary.”).  
40  Id. at 183. 
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citizens [and] the officers entrusted with the execution of laws.”41 Interestingly, 
although Hamilton appears to advocate for citizen militias having the ability to 
enforce domestic law, it is likely that he would “not have similarly argued for a 
large, professional standing army to act as a posse comitatus.”42 This aligns with 
early American thought as citizen militias were generally more trusted than a 
standing army because “the citizenry feared the power of a standing army.”43 
Soon after the Constitution was ratified, Congress enacted a law that permit-
ted presidents to use the militia as backup to civilian law enforcement for the 
limited purpose of suppressing civil unrest.44 However, even when citizen sol-
diers were allowed to be called to serve in the militia to help quell disorder, the 
standing federal army was excluded from such practices.45 
The roots of the debate concerning the law enforcement capabilities of the 
federal army may have started during the formation of the Nation, but it was 
during the Civil War and Reconstruction that the debate came to a head. Indeed, 
the Posse Comitatus Act “was drafted and passed in the aftermath of suspicion 
that federal troops had improperly influenced the southern vote in the presiden-
tial election of 1876.”46 In that election, New York Governor Samuel J. Tilden, 
the Democratic nominee, won the popular vote, but ultimately lost the election; 
the Electoral College failed to indicate a clear winner, thus sending the vote for 
the presidency to the Congress.47 The Republicans in Congress, who controlled 
the Senate, declared Republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes the nineteenth 
President of the United States.48 
As part of the deal struck to make him president, Hayes agreed to numerous 
concessions, most significantly the withdrawal of federal troops from the South, 
ending Reconstruction.49 Thus, in order “to prevent further ‘excessive use of fed-
eral machinery under the Federal Election Laws [as] in the presidential election 
                                                        
41  Schmidt & Klinger, supra note 32, at 688–89. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. (citing Quartered in Your House, supra note 32). 
44  Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law En-
forcement, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 383, 392 (2003) (citing Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 
1 Stat. 264). 
45  Id. 
46  Bennett, supra note 24, at 941. 
47  Id. at 941–42. 
48  See Robert McNamara, The Election of 1876: Hayes Lost Popular Vote but Won White 
House, ABOUT.COM, http://history1800s.about.com/od/presidentialcampaigns/a/electionof18 
76.htm [https://perma.cc/2FY3-ULFG] (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). Republicans controlled 
the Senate and Democrats controlled the House of Representatives when Congress agreed to 
form an Electoral Commission in order to resolve the election results. Id. That Commission 
had seven Democrats and seven Republicans from the Congress and a fifteenth member from 
the Supreme Court who was a Republican. Id. The Commission voted along party lines, giving 
the presidency to Hayes. Id. 
49  Kealy, supra note 44, at 394. Democrats dropped their opposition to Hayes’s selection for 
certain concessions, including the withdrawal of most federal troops from the South and a non-
interference policy. Felicetti & Luce, supra note 19, at 109 n.105. The arrival of federal troops, 
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of 1876,’ ” the forty-fifth Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act and President 
Hayes signed it into law.50  
2. The Forgotten Act 
From conception, the extent that the Posse Comitatus Act limited military 
involvement in civil law enforcement was ill-defined and made for contentious 
debate.51 Immediately after the Act was passed, there was disagreement concern-
ing the extent to which the Act limited a president’s power to use the military to 
enforce domestic law.52 Those who sided with the executive branch argued that 
the Act “had no effect on presidential power, viewing the act only as a direct 
repudiation of the Cushing Doctrine that allowed local sheriffs to call out the 
military to assist in law enforcement.”53 Opponents of this view, already believ-
ing that a president was limited in his ability to use federal troops to execute 
domestic law, argued that the Posse Comitatus Act directly tapered the execu-
tive’s already-limited power to use the military to those situations explicitly enu-
merated by the Act.54 
A larger problem than these differing views as to the proper scope of its 
limitations was that the Posse Comitatus Act was simply ignored. Indeed, the 
                                                        
including black soldiers, had undermined the slaveholders’ authority even before the Emanci-
pation Proclamation formally announced the end of slavery. Id. at 100. After the war was lost, 
the mere “presence of victorious Union troops, including former slaves, humiliated many for-
mer Confederates,” while enabling the safe rise of black political power and organization. Id. 
at 100–01. The deal struck to remove federal troops from the Southern states and end Recon-
struction and was, therefore, a significant concession and a huge blow to white power in the 
South. Id. at 100–01. 
50  Bennett, supra note 24, at 942. 
51  Felicetti & Luce, supra note 19, at 114–15. 
As with many controversial laws, the full extent of the Posse Comitatus Act was not clear to 
all the congressional and executive participants. Some believed, or hoped at least, that the law 
limited the President’s ability to use Army troops domestically to those few instances specifically 
enumerated in other statutes. This interpretation relied upon two implicit beliefs: (1) the Constitu-
tion provided no authority for presidential use of the Army to execute the law; and (2) the language 
proposed by Senator Hill, but not adopted, was the law. It also tended to focus on the rhetoric of 
some of the bill’s strongest Southern supporters as opposed to the law’s actual text. 
Others involved in the debate thought, or hoped, that the law merely restated the obvious. 
After all, federal law authorized President Grant’s use of troops to keep the peace at polling places 
during the 1876 election. Moreover, the Cushing Doctrine simply articulated long-standing prac-
tice that had been ratified by at least three Presidents and the Senate Judiciary Committee. This 
interpretation, however, minimized the multi-year effort of Southern Democrats to pass the Act. 
They certainly didn’t think that the Act simply restated the obvious. 
Id. 
52  Longley, supra note 25, at 720. 
53  Id. 
54  Id. 
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same year that President Hayes signed the Posse Comitatus bill, he marched fed-
eral troops to New Mexico in order to quell the territory’s civil disorder.55 The 
deployment was set in motion by a presidential proclamation with no contribu-
tion or attempts at intervention by Congress, suggesting that the Act had little or 
no effect on presidential power from the start.56 President Hayes was not the only 
commander-in-chief to deploy soldiers to fight lawlessness or for other domestic 
law enforcement missions.57 In 1894, President Grover Cleveland deployed fed-
eral troops to Illinois to help suppress rioting railroad strikers.58 Congress itself 
issued no objection to and essentially remained silent towards this deployment, 
and the troops deployed over the strong objection of the Illinois Governor.59 
In fact, the only domestic deployment of military troops that provoked a re-
sponse from Congress was President McKinley’s use of 500 troops in Coeur 
d’Alene, Idaho, from May 1899 to April 1901.60 The deployment was meant to 
help local law enforcement handle a growing number of disgruntled union min-
ers in the area.61 Congress, through the House Committee on Military Affairs, 
investigated the legality of the President’s deployment.62 The report that resulted 
from the investigation was partisan and split, however, with McKinley’s Repub-
lican majority finding no fault with his or the military commander’s actions.63 In 
                                                        
55  Id. “The deployment of troops to the New Mexico Territory was in response to what history 
has coined the Lincoln County War. Arguably, even under an expansive view of the PCA, the 
use of Federal Troops may have been allowed under the Insurrection Act.” Id. at n.118 (citing 
Felicetti & Luce, supra note 19, at 119). 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  Felicetti & Luce, supra note 19, at 122. 
59  Id. Not only did the governor object, but the mayor had not even requested help from the 
state before federal troops were deployed. Id. 
Over 4700 state National Guard troops were available to assist. At the peak of the riot, about 4000 
were involved in quelling the disorder. This is not the only time that the Cleveland administration 
used a pretext to justify federal intervention in labor disputes. Army troops occupied Coeur 
d’Alene, Idaho, from July to September 1894 to protect unthreatened railroads and monitor tran-
quility. Earlier violence had subsided before the regulars arrived without even the call-up of state 
troops. Local officials pressured the governor to request federal troops, and keep them in place, to 
break the union. 
Id. at 122 n.165 (citation omitted). 
60  Id. at 123. 
61  Id. at 123–24. 
62  Id. at 125. 
63  Id. at 125. 
In a bold display of misdirection, the majority brushed aside the President’s failure to issue a 
proclamation under R[evised] S[tatute] 5300 by reinventing the statute’s text. According to the 
majority, the RS 5300 proclamation was only necessary when the President imposed martial law. 
The troop deployment was, therefore, perfectly legal under the anti-insurrection laws at RS 5297-
5298. 
. . . Surprisingly, the Democrats made absolutely no mention of the Posse Comitatus Act. 
Either Congress had already forgotten about it entirely, or Congress agreed that the Act only undid 
the Cushing Doctrine. Clearly, Congress did not see the Act as imposing any meaningful legal 
limit on the Commander in Chief’s domestic use of the armed forces. 
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all, despite occasional rumblings from Congress, the Posse Comitatus Act was 
largely forgotten until the 1970s.64  
3. The Act Is Reborn 
On February 27, 1973, the American Indian Movement, a radical Native 
American group, seized the town of Wounded Knee in the Pine Ridge Indian 
Reservation in order to protest a tribal chairman.65 This sparked a seventy-one 
day standoff against federal law enforcement officials.66 In order to help the ci-
vilian law enforcement, the Department of Defense sent a representative to give 
tactical advice and assess how the military could help.67 Several individuals were 
arrested for trying to enter Wounded Knee and were charged with interfering 
with lawful performance of the officials’ duties.68 At trial, the defendants prof-
fered that law enforcement officials acted outside their legal authority when they 
made their arrests based on their use of military equipment and the military’s 
involvement, generally.69 The federal district courts in Nebraska, South Dakota, 
and North Dakota that heard these cases disagreed as to whether the Act had been 
violated, but each dealt in some detail with the Posse Comitatus Act, which was 
now on the radar of American jurisprudence.70 
4. The Modern Act 
The original Posse Comitatus Act read, “Whoever, except in cases and under 
circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, will-
fully uses any part of the Army as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the 
laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or 
both.”71 Thus, the 1878 Act only concerned the United States Army. Yet, the Act 
covered the Air Force from its conception “because the Air Force originated as 
a part of the Army and housekeeping legislation maintained the coverage of leg-
islation formerly applicable only to the Army.”72 When the Air Force became its 
                                                        
Id. 
64  Longley, supra note 25, at 721. 
65  Alysa Landry, Native History: AIM Occupation of Wounded Knee Begins, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 27, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianet-
work.com/20 14/02/27/native-history-aim-occupation-wounded-knee-begins-153765 
[https://perma.cc/6WQ5-GFHW]. Approximately “250 Sioux Indians led by members of the 
American Indian Movement converged on South Dakota’s Pine Ridge Reservation, launching 
the famous 71-day occupation of Wounded Knee.” Id. 
66  Longley, supra note 25, at 721. 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. 
71  18 U.S.C. § 1385; see also United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 375 n.5 (4th Cir. 1974) 
(stating that, when the Act was amended in 1958, there was no substantive change except the 
addition of the words “Air Force” to the text). 
72  Id. at 374–75. 
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own branch and separated from the Army, Congress specifically provided that 
the Posse Comitatus Act continued to apply to the newly formed branch.73 In 
1956, the Act was amended with the words “or the Air Force” added immediately 
following the word “Army.”74 
Unlike the Army, and later the Air Force, the Posse Comitatus Act has never 
included the United States Navy and Marine Corps.75 This fact is not based on 
congressional intent to exclude these branches from the Act, but rather because 
the original Posse Comitatus Act was passed as part of an Army Appropriations 
Bill.76 The Department of Defense, however, by an internal directive, extended 
the Posse Comitatus Act to include the Navy and the Marine Corps.77  
B. Judicial Application of the Act 
The United States Supreme Court has only mentioned the Posse Comitatus 
Act in a single case, Laird v. Tatum,78 a 1972 case that involved a challenge to 
the Army’s domestic surveillance program.79 Lower courts, however, developed 
tests for applying the Act in their respective jurisdictions in response to the 
Wounded Knee litigation.80 In each of those cases, the defendants were charged 
with either interfering with or obstructing law enforcement officers engaged in 
lawful performance of their duties, so in each case the Act was only raised by the 
                                                        
73  Id. at 375; see National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.A. § 3004 (West 2012). 
74  Walden, 490 F.2d at 375 n.5; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012) (originally enacted as Act 
of August 10, 1956, ch. 1041 § 18(a), 70A Stat. 626). 
75  See United States v. Chon, 210 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 910 
(2000) (stating that although the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the Army and Air Force from 
participating in civilian law enforcement activities, it does not directly reference the Navy or 
Marine Corps, but noting that that omission does not constitute congressional approval for 
Navy involvement in enforcing civilian laws). 
76  See Walden, 490 F.2d at 374. 
77  The Navy and the Department of Defense have applied the Posse Comitatus Act to the 
Navy as a matter of executive policy. See OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y, DEP’T OF THE NAVY, 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5820.7B, COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS 
(1988); DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE NO. 5525.5, DOD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS (1986) [hereinafter DODD 5525.5]; see also Mark P. Nevitt, Unin-
tended Consequences: The Posse Comitatus Act in the Modern Era, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 119, 
122 (2014). “Nevertheless, neither institution has wavered from its longstanding view that the 
Act does not apply to any military service other than the Army and the Air Force.” Christopher 
A. Abel, Not Fit for Sea Duty: The Posse Comitatus Act, the United States Navy, and Federal 
Law Enforcement at Sea, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 445, 467 (1990). In addition, the Ninth 
Circuit has applied the Posse Comitatus Act in full force against the Navy because of this DOD 
policy. See United States v. Dreyer, 767 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 2014). 
78  408 U.S. 1, 32 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
79  Longley, supra note 25, at 722. The Posse Comitatus Act was only cited in the appendix in 
Justice Douglas’s dissent and did not contain an in-depth analysis regarding how it should be 
applied. See Laird, 408 U.S. at 32 (stating that the Posse Comitatus Act “forbids the use of 
military troops as a posse comitatus”). Without fully explaining why, Justice Douglas stated 
that the Army’s domestic surveillance program violated the Posse Comitatus Act. Id. at 29, 
32; see Longley, supra note 25, at 722. 
80  Longley, supra note 25, at 722. 
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defense to defeat the prosecution’s argument that the arresting or investigating 
agents were engaged in the “lawful” performance of their duties.81 The North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska federal courts developed three distinct 
tests, which define the level of military intervention in civilian law enforcement 
allowed under Posse Comitatus. These tests, which developed at the district court 
level, have “formed the foundation of [Posse Comitatus] jurisprudence over the 
last thirty years.”82 
The first test arose out of the District of North Dakota in United States v. 
McArthur.83 The McArthur test asks, “Are Citizens Being Subjected to Military 
Power that is Regulatory, Proscriptive, or Compulsory in Nature?”84 In the Dis-
trict of Nebraska, United States v. Jaramillo85 focused on civilian law enforce-
ment instead of the citizenry and asked, “Does the Use of the Military Pervade 
the Activities of Law Enforcement Officials?”86 
The last test came from the District of South Dakota in United States v. Red 
Feather.87 There, the court asked whether “the Military [was] Used in a Direct 
and Active Role?”88 The court held that the Act had “two separate” elements.89 
First, to violate the Act, the government must use the military directly, not merely 
                                                        
81  See United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 189, 192–94 (D.N.D. 1975); United 
States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 918, 921–24 (D.S.D. 1975); United States v. Jara-
millo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1376, 1378–81 (D. Neb. 1974). 
82  Longley, supra note 25, at 722. 
83  419 F. Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D. 1975). 
84  Longley, supra note 25, at 722 (citing McArthur, 419 F. Supp. at 190–91). Here, 
Judge Van Sickle undertook the consolidated review of ten indictments resulting from the 
Wounded Knee standoff. The issue in the case was whether law enforcement officers lawfully 
performed their duties when they arrested the defendants. . . . Judge Van Sickle dismissed four for 
insufficient evidence and found the remaining six defendants guilty as charged. 
Id. 
85  380 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Neb. 1974). 
86  Longley, supra note 25, at 723 (citing Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1376). The Judge in Jara-
millo, Judge Urbom held that the government did not establish that the overarching “law en-
forcement activities at Wounded Knee were lawful.” Id. This is critical because, under 18 
U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) (2012), the government has the burden to establish that the “law enforce-
ment officials were lawfully performing their duties.” Id. Hence, because the “government 
failed to show that the involvement of Colonel Warner and military maintenance personnel 
did not violate the [Posse Comitatus Act], and therefore failed to show that federal law en-
forcement officials lawfully performed their duties, Judge Urbom acquitted the defendants.” 
Id. To determine if federal troops had indeed encroached on law enforcement functions, Judge 
Urbom asked if the military personnel had “pervaded the activities” of the civilian authorities. 
Id. However, the Jaramillo decision did not hold that “lending equipment between government 
agencies” violated the Posse Comitatus Act. Id. at 724. Lastly, Judge Urbom found that, “had 
the President ordered military use at Wounded Knee pursuant to his insurrection powers or 
had Congress specifically authorized military personnel to provide advice and maintenance 
assistance to civilian law enforcement, [military involvement] would have been lawful, even 
if it ‘pervaded the activities’ of law enforcement officials.” Id. 
87  392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975). 
88  Longley, supra note 25, at 721 (citing Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. at 921–22). 
89  Id. 
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in a supportive role and not merely by using military equipment.90 Second, the 
court held that the Act “created a requirement that military personnel be active 
participants in law enforcement activities before the [Act] was implicated. . . . 
[P]roviding military equipment, advice, maintenance assistance, and training . . . 
constitutes passive participation by the military . . . ,” which the court found per-
missible.91 
Clearly, the “Wounded Knee” tests have failed to provide a uniform, “clear,” 
or “predictable standard to civilian and military officials.”92 Indeed, since the 
Wounded Knee decision and its progeny, courts have continued to place empha-
sis on the Act’s “ ‘execute the laws’ provision.”93 In addition, because of the high 
level of military involvement that is necessary before the courts are willing to 
call “foul,” there have seldom been even charges of violations of the Act, thus 
there have been few occasions to bring controversies before a court and smooth 
out the very rough edges of Posse Comitatus jurisprudence.94 Rather, because the 
courts that have looked at the issue have not conducted constitutional analyses 
of the Act itself, focusing instead on the somewhat pedantic question of whether 
the military was executing laws in a given case, the jurisprudence is left only 
more confused and complex.95  
Recently, in United States v. Dryer, the Ninth Circuit weighed in on Posse 
Comitatus in regard to the ever growing world of high-tech law enforcement.96 
In Dryer, a special agent with the Navy Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) 
investigated a civilian for online distribution and possession of child pornogra-
phy.97 The court asserted that because the Defendant was not associated with the 
military, the Posse Comitatus Act prevented the NCIS agent from giving that 
type of direct assistance to civilian law enforcement. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the NCIS’s investigation violated the Act.98 The court reversed the dis-
trict court’s denial of the defendant’s suppression motion and remanded it for 
further proceedings.99 
                                                        
90  Id. 
91  Id. at 725. 
92  Id. (“The malleability and ambiguity of the PCA’s ‘execute the laws’ provision can be seen 
in the differing results of the Wounded Knee courts.”). Id. at n.70. Indeed, compare McArthur, 
419 F. Supp. at 194 (no violation), United States v. Casper, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976) (use 
of armed forces “was not material enough to taint the presumption that [the] officers were 
acting in performance of their duties”), and Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. at 924–25 (military 
involvement was passive, therefore no violation), with Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1379–81 
(prosecution failed to show no Posse Comitatus Act violation). 
93  Longley, supra note 25, at 726. 
94  See id. 
95  Id. 
96  United States v. Dreyer, 767 F.3d 826, 827–28 (9th Cir. 2014). 
97  Id. 
98  Id. at 831–32, 835. 
99  Id. at 837. 
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II. EXCEPTIONS AND VARIATIONS TO THE ACT 
Certain uniformed branches have been exempted from the Posse Comitatus 
Act by omission. The Coast Guard is a federal uniformed service, but is not men-
tioned in the Act. In fact, the Coast Guard is authorized to “assist in the enforce-
ment of all applicable Federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and wa-
ters.”100 In addition, although the Act does not address the National Guard, it is 
generally understood that when the National Guard is under federal control, the 
Act applies.101 However, when a state’s Air or Army National Guard is under the 
command of the respective state’s governor, rather than a federal official, those 
personnel are exempt from the Act—despite their status as soldiers or airmen 
and their dress in federal uniforms with “U.S. Army” or “U.S. Air Force” sewn 
on the chests.102 In addition to these exemptions by omission, the Posse Comita-
tus Act is not applicable when either Congress or the Constitution expressly au-
thorizes “policing” by the military.103 Some other exceptions, created by either 
statute or other rule making authority, specifically exempt federal troops from 
certain functions that are within the purview of civilian law enforcement.104  
                                                        
100  14 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“The Coast Guard shall—(1) enforce or assist in the enforcement of 
all applicable Federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the juris-
diction of the United States.”). 
101  Joshua M. Samek, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: A Case for Repeal of the 
Posse Comitatus Act or a Case for Learning the Law?, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 441, 446 (2007). 
102  Gilbert v. United States, 165 F.3d 470, 473 (6th Cir. 1999). 
The Act does not apply to members of the National Guard unless they have been called into 
“federal service.” Until called into such service, members of the National Guard remain state, 
rather than federal officers. Thus, “[e]xcept when employed in the service of the United States, 
officers of the National Guard continue to be officers of the state and not officers of the United 
States or of the Military Establishment of the United States.” “Guardsmen do not become part of 
the Army itself,” as pointed out in United States v. Hutchings, “until such time as they may be 
ordered into active federal duty by an official acting under a grant of statutory authority from 
Congress.” Only when “that triggering event occurs [does] a Guardsman become[] a part of the 
Army and lose[] his status as a state serviceman.” 
Id. (citations omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Perpich v. Dep’t of Defense, 496 U.S. 
334, 345 (1990); then quoting United States v. Dern, 74 F.2d 485, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1934); then 
quoting United States v. Hutchings, 127 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 1997)). 
103  Samek, supra note 101. 
104  See id. at 446–47. There are many minor statutory exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act: 
16 U.S.C. § 23 (Secretary of the Army may detail troops to protect Yel-
lowstone National Park upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior); 
16 U.S.C. § 78 (Secretary of the Army may detail troops to protect Se-
quoia and Yosemite National Parks upon the request of the Secretary of 
the Interior); 
16 U.S.C. § 593 (President may use the land and naval forces of the United 
States to prevent destruction of federal timber in Florida); 
. . . ; 
18 U.S.C. §§ 112, 1116 (Attorney General may request the assistance of 
federal or state agencies—including the Army, Navy and Air Force—to 
protect foreign dignitaries from assault, manslaughter and murder); 
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A. Homeland Security Act of 2002 
When Congress enacted the Posse Comitatus Act, there was widespread de-
bate concerning whether the Act applied to the President of the United States, or 
only to U.S. Marshals and other civilian law enforcement, to preclude them from 
calling upon the military for domestic action.105 The enactment of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 (HSA) put this debate to rest.106 Specifically, section 
466(a)(4) of the HSA excepts enforcement of the Posse Comitatus Act “when 
the use of the Armed Forces is authorized by [an] Act of Congress or the Presi-
dent determines that the use of the Armed Forces is required to fulfill the Presi-
dent’s obligations under the Constitution to respond promptly in time of war, 
insurrection, or other serious emergency.”107 Consequently, according to the 
HSA, the President may call out soldiers for a civilian law enforcement function 
so long as the President deems the deployment necessary to respond to insurrec-
tion, war, or some other major emergency.108 
                                                        
18 U.S.C. § 351 (FBI may request the assistance of any federal or state 
agency—including the Army, Navy and Air Force—in its investigations 
of the assassination, kidnapping or assault of a Member of Congress); 
. . . ; 
18 U.S.C. § 3056 (Director of the Secret Service may request assistance 
from the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to protect the 
President); 
. . . ; 
25 U.S.C. § 180 (President may use military force to remove trespassers 
from Indian treaty lands); 
42 U.S.C. § 98 (Secretary of the Navy at the request of the Public Health 
Service may make vessels or hulks available to quarantine authority at 
various U.S. ports); 
42 U.S.C. § 1989 (magistrates issuing arrest warrants for civil rights vio-
lations may authorize those serving the warrants to call for assistance from 
bystanders, the posse comitatus, or the land or naval forces or militia of 
the United States). 
Id. at 446 n.26 (quoting CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REP. 95-964 S, THE 
POSSE COMITATUS ACT & RELATED MATTERS: THE USE OF THE MILITARY TO EXECUTE 
CIVILIAN LAW 21–22 n.48 (2000)). 
105  See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 886, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified in 6 U.S.C. § 466); see 
also G. NORMAN LIEBER, THE USE OF THE ARMY IN AID OF THE CIVIL POWER 11–16 (1898). 
The act “was expressly intended to prevent United States Marshals, on their own initiative, 
from calling on the Army for assistance in enforcing Federal law.” 6 U.S.C. § 466(a)(2) 
(2012). Thus, before the HSA, the Act only applied to the Marshals and not to the President. 
See id. 
106  See 6 U.S.C. § 466 (2012). It should be noted that because the HSA states that the Posse 
Comitatus Act does not apply to the President when he is performing certain functions, the 
HSA is not technically an exception to the ban on Posse Comitatus, as this section suggests, 
but rather a clarification of the Act. See id. 
107  Id. § 466(a)(4). 
108  See id. 
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B. Insurrection Act109 
Using federal troops to fight an insurrection is not a new concept introduced 
by the HSA. The Insurrection Act has been in existence since 1792 “in one form 
or another.”110 In its original form, the Insurrection Act was passed pursuant to 
the Constitution’s Article I “calling forth” clause and “it limited the President to 
using militia in response to invasion, insurrection, or obstructions of laws ‘too 
powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.’ ”111 In 
a later version, Congress expanded the Act in order to give the President the 
power to respond to hostilities with Spain and to take action against the Aaron 
Burr Conspiracy.112 In the contemporary version of the Insurrection Act, Con-
gress has given the President the power to (1) “use . . . the armed forces, as he 
considers necessary to suppress the insurrection”;113 (2) send federal troops when 
it is “impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the 
ordinary course of judicial proceedings”;114 (3) “suppress the rebellion”;115 and 
(4) “respond to failures by the states to guarantee the rights, privileges, and im-
munities guaranteed by the Constitution.”116 
C. Military Support for Civilian Authorities “Act” 
The military, through the Department of Defense (DOD), partitions its sup-
port of civil law enforcement into three main categories: Military Support to 
Civil Authorities, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, 
and Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances.117 Each category is promulgated 
                                                        
109  It is debatable whether the Insurrection Act is an exception to or expansion of the Posse 
Comitatus Act. Indeed, as discussed, there is a long-standing debate as to whether the Presi-
dent’s actions were ever even regulated by the Posse Comitatus Act. See supra Part II.A. As 
such, if the Posse Comitatus Act never applied to the President, then the Insurrection Act was 
never an exception to the Act. The HSA put this debate to rest, making it clear that it does not 
apply to the President. See id. 
110  Longley, supra note 25, at 732. 
111  Id. (citing Insurrection Act, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264, 264 (1792) (repealed 1795)). 
112  Id. (citing Act of March 3, 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443, 443 (current version at 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 331–335 (2012))). Former Vice President Aaron Burr (under Thomas Jefferson) planned 
an extensive scheme to become the leader of a new nation in the western part of the territories. 
SAMUEL E. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 367–69 (1965). 
113  10 U.S.C. § 331 (2012); see also JENNIFER K. ELSEA & R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RS22266, THE USE OF FEDERAL TROOPS FOR DISASTER ASSISTANCE: LEGAL 
ISSUES 2 (2012) (“The Insurrection Act has been used to send the armed forces to quell civil 
disturbances a number of times during U.S. history, most recently during the 1992 Los Ange-
les riots and during Hurricane Hugo in 1989, during which widespread looting was reported 
in St. Croix, Virgin Islands.”). 
114  10 U.S.C. § 332 (2012). 
115  Id.; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE 
L.J. 149, 164–65 (2004) (tracing the origins of the Insurrection Act). 
116  Longley, supra note 25, at 733 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 333 (2006)). 
117  Samek, supra note 101, at 447 (citing DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3025.15, MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES 17 (1997)). 
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by a detailed directive published by the DOD, which outlines the DOD’s guid-
ance to military and civilian law enforcement and the parameters of the authori-
zation to use military personnel, training, and equipment in civilian missions.118  
Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities, provides for a cen-
tral system in which the various components of the DOD can plan and respond 
to requests for support from civil agencies for civil emergencies.119 The DOD 
also provides “assistance to civil authorities, including support in connection 
with incidents involving an act or threat of terrorism.”120 The directive authorizes 
the DOD to provide an immediate response during emergencies upon the request 
of civilian authorities in order “to save lives, prevent human suffering, or miti-
gate great property damage,” but only when the President has not declared a na-
tional emergency, in which case some other authority to act is invoked.121  
The DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, Directive 
5525.5, was published on January 15, 1986, and updated on December 20, 
1989.122 This Directive’s stated policy is “to cooperate with civilian law enforce-
ment officials to the extent practical. The implementation of this policy shall be 
consistent with the needs of national security and military preparedness, the his-
toric tradition of limiting direct military involvement in civilian law enforcement 
activities, and the requirements of applicable law.”123 Congress explicitly sup-
ported this policy objective by authorizing the DOD to share information, equip-
ment, and training with civilian law enforcement agencies and by authorizing the 
DOD to assist law enforcement agencies after the detonation of a chemical, bio-
logical, or nuclear weapon.124 However, despite this seemingly wide latitude of 
authority, Congress has specifically restricted “direct participation by a member 
of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or 
other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is oth-
erwise authorized by law.”125 
                                                        
118  Id. at 447, 449. 
119  Id. at 448. 
120  DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 2000.12, DOD ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION (AT/FP) 
PROGRAM 2–3 (1999) (describing the obligations of the military during a terrorist act under 
Directive 3025.15). 
The employment of U.S. military forces in response to acts or threats of domestic terrorism must 
be requested by the Attorney General and authorized by the President. All requests for assistance 
in responding to acts or threats of terrorism must be approved by the Secretary of Defense. The 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall assist the Secretary of Defense in implementing the 
DoD operational response to acts or threats of terrorism. 
Id. 
121  Samek, supra note 101, at 449–50. For example, the Stafford Act allows military assis-
tance when civilian authorities request the intervention and the President has not yet declared 
a national emergency. See infra Part II.D. 
122  DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5525.5, DOD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICIALS (1986). 
123  Id. 
124  10 U.S.C. §§ 371, 382 (2012). 
125  10 U.S.C. § 375 (2012). 
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The third main category of military support for civilian law enforcement, 
and which acts as an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, is Military Assistance 
for Civilian Disturbances.126 Directive 3025.12 recognizes the power of the Pres-
ident to mobilize the military and use it in response to “insurrections, rebellions, 
and domestic violence,” and to maintain general law and order.127 
Because the directives are drafted by the military, for the military, critics 
have always regarded the authority granted as overbroad.128 Yet, in the wake of 
convoluted legal precedent, the DOD has been diligent in trying to provide much 
needed support through the guidance these directives offer.129  
At the same time, this DOD support has accelerated, or at the very least fa-
cilitated, the growth of the apparatus that has contributed to the police militari-
zation we see today. Specifically, the Defense Excess Property Program (known 
colloquially as the DOD’s 1033 Program) was designed to better equip local 
communities to handle law enforcement matters themselves.130 Yet, as seen 
                                                        
126  DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3025.12, MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR CIVILIAN 
DISTURBANCES 3–4 (1994). 
127  Id. 
128  See, e.g., Tom Burghardt, Militarizing the “Homeland” in Response to the Economic and 
Political Crisis, GLOBAL RES. (Oct. 11, 2008), http://www.globalresearch.ca/militarizing-the-
homeland-in-response-to-the-economic-and-political-crisis/10534 [https://perma.cc/7Z8H-
VCKY]. 
129  Longley, supra note 25, at 738–39. 
The DOD has not done as well in clarifying the scope of the PCA in terms of what activities 
constitute a law enforcement activity. DODD 5525.5 states that direct assistance to law enforce-
ment by the military violates the PCA except as otherwise provided in the enclosure 4 of DODD 
5525.5. And though DODD 5525.5 goes on to list many of the activities that have been identified 
by courts and Congress as being beyond the scope of the PCA’s “execute the laws” provision by 
virtue of their passivity, DODD 5525.5 itself fails to make the active/passive distinction. But even 
though the directive fails to explicitly state that assistance to law enforcement must be character-
ized as both direct and active to constitute a PCA violation, the actual effect of this shortcoming 
is minimal since the directive specifically authorizes those activities courts and Congress have 
found constitute passive assistance. 
The DOD has also recognized that the PCA does not apply to non-law enforcement assis-
tance to civilian authorities required during a disaster or emergency. In DOD Directive 3025.1 
(“DODD 3025.1”), the military established guidelines that authorize the military, without any 
prior approval from the President, to assist civilian law enforcement during “[i]mminently serious 
conditions” when necessary to “save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property 
damage.” The types of assistance that the military is authorized to provide civil authorities include 
such things as evacuations, providing medical treatment, and clearing debris. The list does not 
include any law enforcement activities and thus properly recognizes the limited scope of the “ex-
ecute the laws” provision of the PCA. 
Therefore, despite the criticism that the PCA has been interpreted by the military too broadly, 
the military has, given the confusion surrounding the Act, done an excellent job of drafting direc-
tives to implement it. Yet this conclusion does not mean the PCA is a success, because in practice 
the military continues to apply the PCA too broadly. As long as the PCA’s restraints are applied 
too broadly in fact by the military, it is irrelevant how well the directives appear to encompass the 
PCA’s true character. 
Id. 
130  See e.g., MO. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXCESS PROPERTY 
PROGRAM (DOD 1033), http://www.dps.mo.gov/dir/programs/cjle/dod.php [https://perma.cc 
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across the nation and highlighted in Ferguson, the program has not led to com-
munity police forces handling matters independently; rather, we see multilayered 
responses by state and federal authorities whenever chaos erupts, such as it did 
in Ferguson in response to its Police Department’s excessive and provocative 
reaction to its citizens.131 
There, the reaction was, in part, a result of the Ferguson Police Department’s 
early missteps in failing to properly deploy the military equipment it did have. It 
must be recognized that community peace officers are not soldiers and, therefore, 
should have no soldiering equipment to misuse. This suggests that local depart-
ments may lack the common-sense prudence to distinguish between circum-
stances that might merit the deployment of such weaponry (such as in cases in-
volving the apprehension and arrest of violent suspects) against those that simply 
do not (such as in cases involving a community voicing its outrage over the vio-
lent death of an unarmed teenager at the hands of a government officer). It is, 
after all, shocking to see military grade assault rifles, mine resistant ambush pro-
tected vehicles (MRAPs), and grenade launchers aimed at U.S. citizens engaged 
in constitutionally protected protest in their own neighborhoods.132  
                                                        
/5SJG-JJR6] (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). Started in 1997, that was originally a program that 
authorized the Department to transfer excess equipment to domestic law enforcement agen-
cies; that included, but was not limited to, body armor, weapons, armored personnel carriers, 
aircraft, and even surveillance equipment. Id. In 2010 and 2011, over $700 million worth of 
equipment was transferred to state and local law enforcement agencies. Madison Ruppert, The 
Pentagon’s 1033 Program: Giving Free Military Equipment to Police Departments Around 
the U.S., ACTIVIST POST (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.activistpost.com/2011/12/pentagons-
1033-program-giving-free.html [https://perma.cc/6ATY-JHR9]. 
131  See MRAPs and Bayonets: What We Know About the Pentagon’s 1033 Program, NPR 
(Sept. 2, 2014, 6:09 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/02/342494225/mraps-and-bayonets-
what-we-know-about-the-pentagons-1033-program [hereinafter MRAPS and Bayonets]. 
“Congress authorized the 1033 program in 1989 to equip local, state and federal agencies in 
the war on drugs. In 1996, Congress widened the program’s scope to include counterterror-
ism.” Id. However, the report goes on to report that research is inconclusive if the original 
public safety goals are, in fact, driving decisions concerning the procurement and deployment 
of equipment: “Areas with large populations or high crime rates aren’t necessarily receiving 
more or less than their share of the items. Nor is a greater amount of equipment being sent to 
areas along the U.S. borders or coasts, places more likely to be drug trafficking corridors or 
terrorist targets.” Id. 
132  See id. The program has delivered 79,288 assault rifles, 205 grenade launchers, 11,959 
bayonets, 3,972 combat knives, night vision equipment worth $124 million, 479 bomb deto-
nator robots, 50 airplanes, 422 helicopters, and camouflage gear and other “deception equip-
ment” worth over $3.6 million. Id. 
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D. The Stafford Act 
As mentioned above, Directive 3025.1 authorizes immediate action by the 
military when civilian authorities request help and the President has not yet de-
clared a disaster or an emergency.133 Once there has been a “Stafford declara-
tion,” the coordination of any military support shifts from the requesting local 
authority to the federal coordinating official.134 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the 
“Stafford Act”) is the chief weapon in the federal government’s arsenal when 
responding to a natural disaster within the borders of the United States.135 
Through the Stafford Act, Congress declared,  
(1) [B]ecause disasters often cause loss of life, human suffering, loss of income, 
and property loss and damage; and (2) because disasters often disrupt the normal 
functioning of governments and communities, and adversely affect individuals 
and families with great severity; special measures, designed to assist the efforts 
of the affected States in expediting the rendering of aid, assistance, and emergency 
services, and the reconstruction and rehabilitation of devastated areas, are neces-
sary.136 
Congress passed the Stafford Act to “provide an orderly and continuing 
means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local governments 
in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering . . . which result[s] 
from such disasters . . . .”137 The primary tools used to realize that goal are the 
Stafford Act’s sections 401 and 501, which provide the President the authority 
to declare major disasters and national emergencies.138 
                                                        
133  See Samek, supra note 101, at 450. 
134  See DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3025.1, MILITARY SUPPORT FOR CIVIL AUTHORITIES 
(MSCA) (1993); DEP’T. OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3025.1-M, MANUAL FOR CIVIL EMERGENCIES 1 
(1994); see also JENNIFER K. ELSEA & R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE USE OF 
FEDERAL TROOPS FOR DISASTER ASSISTANCE: LEGAL ISSUES 7 (2008) (discussing how, under 
the Stafford Act, “[p]ermitted operations include debris removal and road clearance, search 
and rescue, emergency medical care and shelter, provision of food, water, and other essential 
needs, dissemination of public information and assistance regarding health and safety 
measures, and the provision of technical advice to state and local governments on disaster 
management and control. . . . The Stafford Act does not authorize the use of federal military 
forces to maintain law and order. . . . Patrolling in civilian neighborhoods for the purpose of 
providing security from looting and other activities, would not be permissible, although pa-
trolling for humanitarian relief missions . . . (which may have the incidental benefit of deter-
ring crime) would not violate the [Posse Comitatus Act].”). Id. at 4. 
135  See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974 § 101, 42 
U.S.C. § 5121 (1988). 
136  Id. 
137  Id. 
138  42 U.S.C. §§ 5170, 5191 (2012). 
All requests for a declaration by the President that a major disaster exists shall be made by 
the Governor of the affected State. Such a request shall be based on a finding that the disaster is 
of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State . . . . 
Id. § 5170 (emphasis added). 
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Upon a section 401 or 501 declaration, the President has extremely broad 
powers to  
direct any Federal agency [including the DOD], . . . to utilize its authorities and 
the resources granted to it under Federal law (including personnel, equipment, 
supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical, and advisory services) in support of 
State and local assistance response or recovery efforts, including precautionary 
evacuations.139 
The deployment of federal troops to support disaster relief is not an excep-
tion to the Posse Comitatus Act because, under the Stafford Act, the military is 
not permitted to engage in civilian law enforcement.140 The military is permitted, 
however, to carry out valid military operations and any enforcement of criminal 
law that is incidental to those operations. Such valid military operations include 
establishing a traffic control point on a civilian highway to ensure the security of 
military supplies or routes and conducting search and rescue missions after a 
national disaster where the mere presence of the military deters other criminal 
activity.141 Thus, notwithstanding the general principle behind the Posse Comi-
tatus Act, the President or his designee “under the guise of general federal assis-
tance . . . has the entire resources of . . . the military, with which to support state 
and local assistance efforts.”142 
III. SAVE, KILL, OR MODIFY 
A. Status Quo 
1. Blurring the Line Between Police and Soldiers143  
Related to Posse Comitatus and the distinct roles that police and soldiers 
play is an important paradigm shift that has been ongoing since the United States 
first declared its war on drugs and, then, its war on terror. With regard to terror-
ism’s impact since 9/11, there has been a rapid transfer of power from law en-
forcement to the military, which is now seen as the primary player in this field.144 
                                                        
All requests for a declaration by the President that an emergency exists shall be made by the 
Governor of the affected State. Such a request shall be based on a finding that the situation is of 
such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State . . . . 
Id. § 5191 (emphasis added). 
139  Id. § 5170(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
140  Samek, supra note 101, at 459. Additionally, the Posse Comitatus Act does not restrict the 
President from deploying troops. 
141  Id. 
142  Id. at 455. 
143  Much of this section is adapted from Arthur Rizer & Joseph Hartman, How the War on 
Terror Has Militarized the Police, ATLANTIC (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/na-
tional/archive/2011/11/how-the-war-on-terror-has-militarized-the-police/248047 
[https://perma.cc/VYQ3-DHB5]. 
144  See generally Norman C. Bay, Executive Power and the War on Terror, 83 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 335 (2005). 
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This shift is memorialized in the White House’s 2006 National Strategy for Com-
bating Terrorism, in which President George W. Bush affirmed that the United 
States has “broken old orthodoxies that once confined our counterterrorism ef-
forts primarily to the criminal justice domain.”145 This shift in dogma is easily 
executed outside the United States, where the military has an almost plenary 
presence in the counterterrorism world.146 However, the Posse Comitatus Act 
restricts military action inside the borders of the United States, thus leaving coun-
terterrorism responsibilities primarily on the shoulders of local and federal law 
enforcement officials.147  
Although the military is equipped to fight the wars on drugs and terrorism, 
the Posse Comitatus Act prevents military involvement in the everyday police 
work so crucial to the success of these types of wars. As a result, police forces 
around the country have been militarizing in order to better wage the war on 
drugs and the war on terror.148 While this phenomenon appears rational, the side 
effects of the militarization of American police forces are complicated. Specifi-
cally, equipping, training, and mentally preparing the individual police of-
ficer/sometime soldier is a convoluted process.  
Police departments have increased their use of military grade equipment to 
perform their duties. This use rapidly increased following the declaration of the 
“war on drugs” and again has been accelerating after 9/11.149 If military equip-
ment helps police prevent more crime and catch more criminals, then it should 
be deemed a positive sharing of technology, right? Not necessarily. The acquisi-
tion of military equipment by local police forces is especially alarming to civil 
libertarians and legal professionals.150 By allowing civilian law enforcement to 
use military weapons and technology, it is argued, the line between police officer 
and soldier is blurred. The mission and mentality of a police officer are neces-
sarily different from those of a soldier; blurring that distinction invites an identity 
crisis in those patrolling our neighborhoods. The mere possibility of this raises 
red flags for many.  
This alarm grows especially loud regarding military weapons coming into 
community police departments. In truth, police departments have been acquiring 
                                                        
145  The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T STATE, 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/71803.htm [https://perma.cc/X8MY-S5J8] (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2015). 
146  See generally Ari D. MacKinnon, Counterterrorism and Checks and Balances: The Span-
ish and American Examples, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 602 (2007). 
147  See Scott R. Tkacz, In Katrina’s Wake: Rethinking the Military’s Role in Domestic Emer-
gencies, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 301, 324–25 (2006). 
148  See Steven G. Brandl, Back to the Future: The Implications of September 11, 2001 on Law 
Enforcement Practice and Policy, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133, 145–48 (2003) (discussing how 
the business of police work is being militarized). 
149  See Marc M. Harrold, A New Kind of Traffic[king] Cop on the International “Beat” of 
Human Trafficking, 1 CHARLESTON L. REV. 97, 119–20 (2006); Rizer & Hartman, supra note 
6. 
150  See Donna Smith, Note, Passenger Profiling: A Greater Terror than Terrorism Itself?, 32 
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 167, 190 n.175 (1998). 
16 NEV. L.J. 467 RIZER - FINAL.DOCX 3/31/2016  8:26 AM 
Spring 2016] THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT 491 
more military weapons for the patrolling of “Mayberry,” much to the chagrin of 
civil liberties groups.151 Before 9/11, the heavy weaponry of a small-town cop 
was the standard pump action shotgun; there may have been a high power rifle 
such as a surplus M-16 in the trunk of the supervising officer.152 Today, in small 
towns, every patrol car carries a trunkful of weaponry and gear; in many cities, 
officers walk the beat in battle uniforms with assault rifles.153 The extent of this 
weapon inflation does not stop with high power rifles and body armor. Both big 
and small police departments have acquired armored vehicles (tank-like vehicles, 
in fact) and machine guns from the military for use in domestic police work.154  
“To assist them in deploying this new weaponry, police departments have 
also sought and received extensive military training and tactical instruction.”155 
Originally, the Special Weapons and Tactics (S.W.A.T.) teams were hallmarks 
of only bigger cities and were called out when no other peaceful option was 
available—when a truly militaristic response was necessary.156 “Today, virtually 
every police department in the nation has one or more S.W.A.T. teams, the mem-
bers of [which] are often trained by and with United States special operations 
commandos.”157 Additionally, “with the safety of their officers in mind, these 
departments now habitually deploy their S.W.A.T. teams for such minor opera-
tions as serving warrants.”158 In short, what was once “special” has quietly be-
come “routine.”159  
“The most serious consequence of the rapid militarization of American po-
lice forces, however, is the subtle evolution in the mentality of the ‘men in blue’ 
                                                        
151  Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6; see also Chuck Murphy & Sydney P. Freedberg, Military 
Weapons Land in Hands of Local Cops with Little Oversight, 26 IRE J., Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 
36. 
152  This Author worked as a police officer in the city of Cheney, Washington. In Cheney, each 
patrol car had a shotgun and the sergeant on duty would often have a high powered rifle. 
153  While on a business trip, this Author personally witnessed a patrolman in the Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, airport who was armed on what appeared to be a routine patrol with an M-4 (the 
more compact version of the better known M-16). 
154  Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6; see Paul Craig Roberts, Your Local Police Force Has 
Been Militarized, CREATORS.COM, http://www.creators.com/opinion/paul-craig-roberts/your-
local-police-force-has-been-militarized.html [https://perma.cc/QU4G-2CYH] (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2015). 
155  Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6; see Harrold, supra note 148, at 120 (citing DIANE CECILIA 
WEBER, CATO INST., WARRIOR COPS: THE OMINOUS GROWTH OF PARAMILITARISM IN 
AMERICAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS (1999), http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp50.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/GCB9-AYL7]). 
156  Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6; see With Article, McVeigh Describes Motivation for 
Bombing, FOX NEWS (Apr. 27, 2001), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2001/04/27/with-arti-
cle-mcveigh-describes-motivation-for-bombing.html [https://perma.cc/SNA8-RYWS] [here-
inafter FOX NEWS]. 
157  Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6. See generally FOX NEWS, supra note 155. 
158  Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6; FOX NEWS, supra note 155. 
159  Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6; see FOX NEWS, supra note 155. 
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from ‘peace officer[s]’ to soldier[s].”160 This development “represents a funda-
mental change in the nature of law enforcement.”161 The primary goal or mission 
of an officer is to keep the peace and enforce the law; “[t]hose whom an officer 
suspects to have committed a crime are treated as just that—suspects.”162 Offic-
ers are duty-bound to protect the rights of all civilians—even known criminals 
or those suspected of committing violent crimes—because of the sacrosanct 
American mantra: innocent until proven guilty.163 “Moreover, police officers op-
erate among a largely friendly population and have traditionally been trained to 
solve problems using [the] legal system,” and reserving “the deployment of lethal 
violence [as] an absolute last resort.”164  
Soldiers, by contrast, are told to label people as “belonging to one of two 
groups: the enemy and the non-enemy.”165 The mission for soldiers is to kill the 
enemy and try not to kill the non-enemy, and soldiers often reach this decision 
“while surrounded by a population that considers the soldier an occupying 
force.”166 Indeed, part of the Soldier’s Creed reads, “I stand ready to deploy, 
engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close com-
bat.”167 This is a far cry from the peace officers’ creed “to protect and serve.”168  
“The point here is not to suggest that police officers in the field should not 
take advantage of every tactic or piece of equipment that makes” the officers and 
innocent bystanders as safe as possible as the officers carry out their challenging 
and dangerous duties.169 It is also not suggested “that a police officer, once 
trained in military tactics, will now seek to kill civilians.”170 It is easy to “second-
guess the way police officers perform their jobs while they are out on the streets 
waging what must, at times, feel like war.”171 This Article does not attempt to 
second-guess the actions of those in the media spotlight. Rather, the purpose is 
to use the events highlighted recently in the national media to identify that the 
                                                        
160  Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6. 
161  Id. 
162  Id.; see Joel Miller, Cops At War: The Drug War and the Militarization of Mayberry, 
RUTHERFORD INST.: OLDSPEAK (Dec. 30, 2002), https://www.rutherford.org/publications_re-
sources/oldspeak/cops_at_war_the_drug_war_and_the_militarization_of_mayberry 
[https://perma.cc/YCU4-AQUK]; see also MARILYN OLSEN, STATE TROOPER: AMERICA’S 
STATE TROOPERS AND HIGHWAY PATROLMEN 17 (2001) (“The difference between the []mili-
tary and the [police] is that the civil policeman should have no enemies. People may be crim-
inals, they may be violent, but they are not enemies to be destroyed.”). 
163  Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6; accord Miller, supra note 161. 
164  Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6. 
165  Id.; see FOX NEWS, supra note 155, at 3. 
166  Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6. 
167  Soldier’s Creed, U.S. ARMY, http://www.army.mil/values/soldiers.html [https://per 
ma.cc/3VWC-7T5D] (last visited Nov. 28, 2015); accord Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6. 
168  Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6. 
169  Id. 
170  Id. 
171  Id. 
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nation should be mindful that when police officers dress like soldiers, carry sol-
diers’ weapons, and are trained like soldiers, they very well may begin to act like 
soldiers. Most importantly, a soldier’s primary objective is to kill the enemy.172 
With that in mind, it is easy to argue that the principles behind the Posse Comi-
tatus Act are not only justifiable, but also prudent. Yet, as will be discussed infra, 
in many instances, the United States has skirted the “no standing army” principle 
our founders held so dear, specifically the “no military in domestic law enforce-
ment” rule announced in the Posse Comitatus Act, by simply militarizing our 
police forces.173  
The need for a distinction between police and soldiers is key to the issue at 
hand. In some instances, the type of brutal violence that only the military can 
provide may be needed. But that is not to say that the overriding question behind 
the Posse Comitatus Act is not relevant. If the nation does not want its police to 
act, train, and deploy like soldiers, how will it respond when actual soldiers, with 
the above mentioned mentality, are deployed as law enforcement?  
2. Liberty or Security 
The balance between liberty and security has engaged American thought 
since the drafting of the Declaration of Independence. Indeed, Benjamin Franklin 
once famously said, “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a 
little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.”174 
The partition of civilian law enforcement from the military has a long and 
purposeful history in American democracy.175 As farfetched as it may seem to 
contemporary Americans, the notion that the military must be suppressed is an 
essential doctrine for any democracy; indeed the survival of a nation depends 
upon it.176 “An increased military presence in everyday life blurs the distinction 
between these two very different groups, and this is a dangerous path.”177 Some 
caution must be exercised against disregarding fears of those who “imagin[e] 
that more and more law enforcement work could lead to a ‘militarization’ of our 
society” because an increased military presence at home could lay the ground-
work for a military coup.178 Indeed, there is evidence that one of the very pur-
poses of the Posse Comitatus Act was to prevent the military from ultimately 
usurping the civilian government.179 However, one could argue that the Posse 
                                                        
172  Id. 
173  See infra Part III.B.4 and accompanying notes. 
174  Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor (Nov. 11, 1755), supra note 24. 
175  See Bennett, supra note 24, at 941–42. 
176  See id. at 943–44. 
177  Id. at 943. 
178  Id. (citing Charles J. Dunlap Jr., The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012, 
PARAMETERS, Winter 1992, at 2, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2501 
[https://perma.cc/9CLW-HAB2]). 
179  See id. “The Act was born out of the extensive use of federal troops for law enforcement 
in the South following the Civil War. Congress, recognizing that the long-term use of the 
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Comitatus Act has simply encouraged the very thing it was trying to protect, and 
instead of potential usurpers wearing green military uniforms, they now wear 
blue. 
3. Just Not Very American  
While the fear of a military takeover may be exaggerated, the fear that the 
military will be used in inappropriate ways is not. To be sure, there have been 
numerous examples of the improper use of armed soldiers throughout this na-
tion’s history. One such example, mentioned above, occurred from May 1899 to 
April 1901, when President McKinley deployed 500 troops to Coeur d’Alene at 
the request of the Governor of Idaho in order to contend with malcontent min-
ers.180 In Coeur d’Alene, soldiers went house to house and helped the local police 
arrest every adult male.181 These “prisoners” were held without charge for 
weeks.182 Another example took place during World War I, when the War De-
partment (now the DOD) deployed troops to quash strikes that were being orga-
nized by the International Workers of the World Union.183 There, the military 
used more than just “hard power”; it also used military intelligence operatives to 
harass and ultimately arrest union leaders.184 The army was also used against 
union-organized strikes in Gary, Indiana; Butte, Montana; and Seattle, Washing-
ton; and to occupy copper mines in Arizona and Montana to ensure union activ-
ities were fully suppressed.185 These abuses are not limited to times of war, or to 
very different historical circumstances for that matter. Indeed, during the 1993 
standoff between David Koresh’s Branch Davidians and federal agents in Waco, 
Texas, U.S. Army Special Operations, direct-action teams gave advice to and 
rehearsed the initial raid with agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
                                                        
Army to enforce civilian laws posed a potential danger to the military’s subordination to ci-
vilian control, passed the Act.” CRAIG T. TREBILCOCK, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., 
POSSE COMITATUS—HAS THE POSSE OUTLIVED ITS PURPOSE? 1 (2000), http://www.csis.org/me 
dia/csis/pubs/trebilcock.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF6B-5SVQ]. 
180  Felicetti & Luce, supra note 19, at 123–24. 
181  GENE HEALY, CATO INST., POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 503, DEPLOYED IN THE U.S.A.: THE 
CREEPING MILITARIZATION OF THE HOME FRONT 3 (2003), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.o 
rg/files/pubs/pdf/pa503.pdf [https://perma.cc/HCG5-SS8S]. 
182  Id. at 3–4. 
183  Id. at 4. Also during the First World War, 
[c]oncerns about German saboteurs . . . led to unrestrained domestic spying by U.S. Army intelli-
gence operatives. Civilian spies for the Army were given free rein to gather information on poten-
tial subversives and were often empowered to make arrests as special police officers. The War 
Department relied heavily on a quasi-private volunteer organization called the American Protec-
tive League. The APL was composed of self-styled “patriots” who agreed to inform on their fellow 
citizens. At the War Department’s request, APL volunteers harassed and arrested opponents of the 
draft. 
Id. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. 
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Firearms—that military style operation ended with more than eighty civilians 
dead, twenty-seven of which were children.186  
Conversely, not all uses of the military to enforce civil law have been nega-
tive. Certainly President Eisenhower’s use of the Army’s 101st Airborne Divi-
sion to escort nine black children to attend a segregated school, commonly 
known as the Little Rock Nine, was a positive use of federal troops.187 The Little 
Rock Nine conflict started when the Arkansas National Guard, under the orders 
of the Governor, blocked the students from attending school.188 On September 
25, 1957, soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division, the Screaming Eagles, es-
corted the children to school and remained for the duration of the school year.189 
President Eisenhower cited that he had authority to use federal troops in that case 
under 10 U.S.C. § 332, the Insurrection Act, which allows the use of the military 
when the President believes that it is “impracticable to enforce the laws of the 
United States in any State [or Territory] by the ordinary course of judicial pro-
ceedings” because of the “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, 
or rebellion against the authority of the United States.”190 Even with these effec-
tive and positive uses of the military to promote social justice while acting in a 
                                                        
186  Id. 
187  See Little Rock Nine, ENCYCLOPEDIA ARK. HIST. AND CULTURE, http://www.encycloped 
iaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=723 [https://perma.cc/5AT2-P323] 
(last updated Sept. 9, 2010). 
188  Id. 
The Nine remained at home for more than two weeks, trying to keep up with their school-
work as best they could. When the federal court ordered Gov. Faubus to stop interfering with the 
court’s order, Faubus removed the guardsmen from in front of the school. On September 23, the 
Nine entered the school for the first time. The crowd outside chanted, “Two, four, six, eight. . . . 
We ain’t gonna integrate!” and chased and beat black reporters who were covering the events. The 
Little Rock police, fearful that they could not control the increasingly unruly mob in front of the 
school, removed the Nine later that morning. They once again returned home and waited for fur-
ther information on when they would be able to attend school. 
Id. 
189  Id. 
[T]he military assigned guards to escort [the children] to classes. The guards, however, could not 
go everywhere with the students, and harassment continued in places such as the restrooms and 
locker rooms. After the 101st Airborne soldiers returned to Ft. Campbell in November, leaving 
the National Guard troops in charge, segregationist students intensified their efforts to compel the 
Nine to leave Central. The Little Rock Nine did not have any classes together. They were not 
allowed to participate in extracurricular activities at Central. Nevertheless, they returned to school 
every day to persist in obtaining an equal education. 
. . . . 
. . . On May 27, 1958, Ernest Green became Central’s first black graduate. Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr. attended his graduation ceremony. Green later told reporters, “It’s been an interesting 
year. I’ve had a course in human relations first hand.” The other eight, like their counterparts 
across the district, were forced to attend other schools or take correspondence classes the next year 
when voters opted to close all four of Little Rock’s high schools to prevent further desegregation 
efforts. 
Id. 
190  10 U.S.C. § 332 (2012); see Exec. Order No. 10,730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept. 24, 1957). 
16 NEV. L.J. 467 RIZER - FINAL.DOCX 3/31/2016  8:26 AM 
496 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:467  
law enforcement capacity, many still argue that the nation should still question 
the wisdom of ever using military troops as domestic law enforcement agents.191 
Another concern that arises when the roles of the military and law enforce-
ment are blurred is “the need to maintain a universal trust in the military as a 
non-political body.”192 It may be true that if the military gained the reputation of 
being the lap dog of the executive or legislative branch, then “it is likely that 
Americans’ distrust of the government would lead to them, correctly or incor-
rectly, perceiving that the military was abandoning its crucial political neutrality. 
If the American people made that leap, institutional trust and confidence in the 
military would be undermined.”193 
Lastly, as one author eloquently stated, “[T]here is something inherently re-
pugnant to most Americans at the thought of the military patrolling the streets of 
our cities and towns. . . . An inarguably chilling image that should cause [Posse 
Comitatus Act] opponents to hesitate.”194 
4. The Army Has a Job 
Proponents of abandoning the Posse Comitatus Act and allowing the military 
to have a greater role in civilian law enforcement are not rooted in the belief that 
the Army and other branches are underutilized. Indeed, quite the opposite is 
true—the military is overburdened because of constant deployments to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, worn out equipment, and 57,000-plus casualties from those two 
conflicts.195 Thus, any time or resources the military spends on missions that are 
chiefly civilian in nature is time or resources taken away from their principal 
mission to defend the nation from foreign enemies.196 Moreover, some argue that 
                                                        
191  See Bennett, supra note 24, at 944. 
192  Id. Although “polls suggest that only 22 [percent] of the American people trust Congress, 
and only 44 [percent] trust the president, an impressive 74 [percent] of people in this country 
trust the military.” Id. 
193  Id. 
194  Id. 
195  Operation Enduring Freedom: U.S. Wounded Totals, ICASUALITIES.ORG, http://icasual 
ties.org/OEF/USCasualtiesByState.aspx [https://perma.cc/7DVW-JX2U] (last visited Nov. 
28, 2015) (reporting the wounded in Afghanistan, as of September 2012, numbered 17,674); 
Iraq Coalition Casualties: U.S. Wounded Totals, ICASUALITIES.ORG, http://icasual-
ties.org/Iraq/USCasualtiesByState.aspx [https://perma.cc/YK5C-NSXC] (last visited Nov. 28, 
2015) (reporting the wounded in Iraq, as of November 2011, numbered 32,223); Iraq Coalition 
Casualties: Fatalities By Year, ICASUALITIES.ORG, http://icasualties.org/Iraq/ByYear.aspx 
[https://per ma.cc/68Q4-DXAH] (last visited Nov. 28, 2015) (reporting the fatalities in Iraq, 
as of November 19, 2015, numbered 4,495). 
196  Bennett, supra note 24, at 945. 
Although politicians often claim that military effectiveness will not be harmed by domestic, peace-
time uses of combat soldiers, this is not borne out by the evidence. A GAO report, while acknowl-
edging that peace operations can provide valuable experience, states that “such participation can 
also degrade a unit’s war-fighting capability.” 
Id. (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-96-14, PEACE OPERATIONS: EFFECT 
OF TRAINING EQUIPMENT, AND OTHER FACTORS ON UNIT CAPABILITY 2–3 (1995)). 
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using military troops in non-combat roles can diminish the overall effectiveness 
of the armed forces due to “atrophy” of their skills, resulting in the need to retrain 
troops when they are needed for combat missions.197 
5. If It Isn’t Broken—Don’t Fix It 
The most prevalent argument against the Posse Comitatus Act is that it pre-
vents the federal government from effectively responding to a disaster.198 How-
ever, supporters of the Act argue there are numerous built-in mechanisms that 
function as exceptions to the Act and other circumstances in which the Act 
simply does not apply.199 Furthermore, these exceptions and omissions should 
be more than adequate to allow the government to respond to an emergency with-
out weakening the line between police and soldiers.200 The President always re-
tains the power to use the armed forces to fulfill the obligations of his Office 
under “the Constitution to respond promptly in time of war, insurrection, or other 
serious emergency.”201 And military troops can be used “to protect Federal prop-
erty and Federal governmental functions when the need for protection exists and 
duly constituted local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate pro-
tection.”202 Hence, the ability to use federal troops to secure government func-
tions, although not comprehensive, is present, providing the President some flex-
ibility to deploy the military in a domestic setting.203 Looking to the tragedy in 
New Orleans after Katrina, from which much of the recent criticism of the Posse 
Comitatus stems,204 the federal government had the authority to mobilize the 
military in order to protect the rights of life, liberty, and property.205  
B. Repealing the Law: A Case for Killing the Posse Comitatus Act  
1. Archaic 
The most obvious reason cited to repeal the Posse Comitatus Act is that it is 
archaic in its very nature.206 Certainly a law written over 100 years ago out of the 
                                                        
197  Id. (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 195, at 5). 
198  Id. at 947. 
199  See id. 
200  See id. at 951. 
201  6 U.S.C. § 466(a)(4) (2012). 
202  32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c)(1)(ii) (2015). 
203  Bennett, supra note 24, at 948–49. 
204  See, e.g., Gene Healy, What of ‘Posse Comitatus’?, CATO INST., http://www.cato.org/pub 
lications/commentary/what-posse-comitatus [https://perma.cc/62KY-75GP] (last visited Nov. 
28, 2015). 
205  Bennett, supra note 24, at 951. 
206  See id. at 945. 
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depths of the Civil War cannot be fully applicable in modern America.207 More-
over, it seems disingenuous to treat the Posse Comitatus Act as a bastion of civil 
liberty when it was born out of political swindling and a possible stolen elec-
tion.208 Is it not true that “[a] good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can 
a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit”?209 Thus, it could be argued that the Posse 
Comitatus Act, because it came forth from a “corrupt tree,” cannot be one of the 
vanguards of freedom and government restraint. 
Another argument for repealing the Posse Comitatus Act comes from an un-
likely source: its supporters. As seen above, proponents of the Act contend that, 
regardless of the Posse Comitatus Act, there are other laws that allow the gov-
ernment to deploy troops in virtually any capacity.210 One supporter stated that 
if one is worried about the Posse Comitatus Act, “they can take solace in one 
fact: the Posse Comitatus Act is nearly one hundred and thirty years old, is a 
criminal statute, and no one has ever been charged or prosecuted under it.”211 
Rather, it is argued that the Posse Comitatus Act represents an important and 
“clear delineation between the civil and military realm, and its greatest utility 
occurs when, in considering an unwise course of action, the military is forced to 
admit, ‘We can’t do that. That violates Posse Comitatus.’ ”212 However, that ar-
gument falls on its own proverbial sword because it begs the question, if other 
laws excuse the government to act with federal troops in almost any circum-
stance, what is the point of keeping the law on the books? Is it not, then, obsolete 
by definition?213  
This patchwork of laws—the Posse Comitatus Act banning the use of federal 
troops and the series of laws, regulations, and interpretations that allow for the 
use of federal troops—seriously confuses the jurisprudence in this area. This con-
fusion thereby “impedes th[e] important mission [of the military] and does little 
to protect civil liberties.”214 There are situations where the Posse Comitatus Act 
has created a tortuous command and control structure where there is serious con-
fusion as to who is in charge when the military is called out under one of the 
exceptions;215 where the Act has decreased both military and civilian response 
                                                        
207  Id.; see Tom Bowman & Siobhan Gorman, Increasing Military’s Role Raises Questions, 
BALT. SUN (Sept. 20, 2005), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2005-09-20/news/0509200 
262_1_comitatus-posse-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/H2XV-MDHM] (“A senior Pen-
tagon official said the military’s response to Katrina has been complicated by ‘archaic laws’ 
that were ‘difficult to work through.’ The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act generally bars active-
duty military from law-enforcement activities on U.S. soil.”). 
208  See supra Part I.A. 
209  Matthew 7:18 (King James). 
210  See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2012). 
211  Bennett, supra note 24, at 952. 
212  Id. at 953. 
213  See id. 
214  Felicetti & Luce, supra note 19, at 179. 
215  Peter Gosselin & Doyle McManus, Wider Powers for U.S. Forces in Disasters Are Under 
Review, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/sep/11/nation/na-po 
sse11 [https://perma.cc/ZY58-2HM6] (following Hurricane Katrina, stating that the White 
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times;216 and where it has, at times, left the federal response vulnerable to exploi-
tation by an adversary. The confusion goes as far as creating bizarre interpreta-
tions such as the United States Navy believing that it loses authority to conduct 
missions the closer it gets to the homeland.217 Another nonsensical example ap-
peared after the 9/11 attacks: National Guard soldiers, while in helicopters en 
route to their assignments along the Canadian border, were banned from con-
ducting surveillance from the air.218  
2. Limiting the Greatest Resource When It Is Needed Most 
There is a compelling argument that the Posse Comitatus Act limits the fed-
eral government from using its greatest resource during its greatest time of need. 
In reality, those who wish to abolish the Posse Comitatus Act do not argue that 
the military should be used for routine traffic stops and patrolling urban areas. 
Rather, the debate comes into play during national emergencies. 
With just over 600,000 civilian employees, the DOD is by far the biggest 
federal department, three times bigger than the second largest department, the 
Department of Veteran Affairs at 200,000.219 In addition to civilians, the DOD 
also has over 1,300,000 active duty uniformed service members with another 
million in the ready reserves.220 The DOD, as a whole, towers over each of the 
                                                        
House’s “interest in expanding presidential powers to deploy the military on United States soil 
stems partly from its frustration over the inability to negotiate an agreement on chain of com-
mand with Louisiana’s governor in the first days after Hurricane Katrina struck.”). 
216  See, e.g., Chris Quillen, Posse Comitatus and Nuclear Terrorism, 32 PARAMETERS, Spring 
2002, at 60, 71 (“Outdated and inflexible American legislation has produced a patchwork con-
sisting of constitutional and statutory exceptions so that the realities of domestic operations 
can be performed. . . . The potential consequences of this approach include a convoluted com-
mand and control structure, decreased response time, and continuity-of-operations problems; 
it also leaves the federal response vulnerable to exploitation by the adversary.” (quoting Sean 
M. Maloney, Domestic Operations: The Canadian Approach, 27 PARAMETERS, Autumn 1997, 
at 150)). 
217  Felicetti & Luce, supra note 19, at 179. That article discusses, in part, a situation where 
the Navy was prevented from supporting a Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment team 
that was boarding “a suspected foreign terrorist vessel approaching the United States . . . . The 
Navy and DOD maintain that this prohibition is statutory, however.” Id. at 89 n.10. Because 
of an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, however, the Navy is allowed to board a U.S. 
fishing vessel to enforce routine fisheries regulations. See 16 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012). Thus, the 
PCA may prevent the Navy from protecting the United States from possible foreign enemies 
while allowing it to regulate fishing. 
218  Felicetti & Luce, supra note 19, at 89 n.10. 
219  See Dennis V. Damp, Largest Federal Departments, MONSTER: GOVCENTRAL, 
http://www.govcentral.com/careers/articles/402-largest-federal-departments [https://perma.cc 
/5SQH-PYUT] (last visited Nov. 28, 2015). 
220  See United States of America Military Strength, GLOBALFIREPOWER.COM, 
http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=united-
states-of-america [https://perma.cc/62ET-439G] (last updated Nov. 13, 2015); see also U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF., 2012 DEMOGRAPHICS: PROFILE OF THE MILITARY COMMUNITY, at iii, vii (2012), 
http://www.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/2012_Demographics_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F5XN-9JK4]. This number includes the active Army, Navy, Air Force, and 
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other departments by nearly a fourteen to one ratio.221 What is impressive about 
these numbers is that the entire Department of Justice has only 103,479 employ-
ees and the FBI, the largest federal “police force,” has less than 15,000 special 
agents.222 While not every service member has the same training as an FBI Spe-
cial Agent, almost every member of the military has basic weapons training, is 
in reasonable shape, and is organized in a unit where they are trained to deploy 
and follow the orders of their commanding officers.  
With these numbers in mind, it makes perfect sense to use members of the 
military in a law enforcement capacity during an emergency. They are already 
trained, they have the ability to move to areas with great speed and efficiency, 
and they are already organized for command and control purposes. The resources 
and expertise of the military clearly indicate that it would play a constructive role 
in any response.223 Therefore, as one scholar noted, “[I]f the question is simply 
whether the military would be helpful in the aftermath of [a major disaster], the 
answer should be a resounding yes.”224 
An analogy could be made to the use of United Nation soldiers. They have 
a mandate to “protect and serve” in a sense, yet they are soldiers first.225 In the 
United States military, service members are sent on special tours to the United 
Nations, and despite the fact that they are trained as soldiers, airmen, sailors, and 
marines, they perform their duties as peacekeepers competently—and often with 
merit—and return to their American units when their tours are over.226 
3. War Has Come and the Military Is Fighting It 
Some argue that while the Posse Comitatus Act had a place in America’s 
history, the new enemy (terrorists) are such that the old system must give way to 
                                                        
Marine Corps, along with the Army National Guard, Army Reserves, Air Force National 
Guard, Air Force Reserves, Navy Reserves, and Marine Corps Reserves. This number specif-
ically excludes the Coast Guard, who are statutorily exempt from the Posse Comitatus Act and 
thus irrelevant to this discussion. See id. 
221  See Damp, supra note 218. 
222  See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., TODAY’S FBI: FACTS & FIGURES 
2013–2014, at 7–9 (2014); Damp, supra note 218. 
223  Christopher Ligatti, Note, The Legality of American Military Troops Engaging in Domes-
tic Law Enforcement in the Event of a Major Terrorist Attack, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 199, 231 
(2006).  
224  Id. 
225  See generally Peacekeeping Operations, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations [https://perma.cc/TL89-QMPT] (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2015). “UN Peacekeepers provide security and the political and peacebuilding sup-
port to help countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to peace. UN Peace-
keeping is guided by three basic principles: Consent of the parties; Impartiality; [and] Non-
use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.” What Is Peacekeeping?, 
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeep 
ing.shtml [https://perma.cc/XVT8-Z4HX] (last visited Nov. 28, 2015). 
226  See generally About Us, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, http://www.un.org/en/peace 
keeping/about [https://perma.cc/F9LN-RNN9] (last visited Nov. 28, 2015). 
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something new—specifically, the military working domestically.227 Further-
more, many believe that after 9/11, there is virtually universal agreement that 
separating the responsibilities for fighting this new kind of war between the nu-
merous branches of government dedicated to protecting the citizens “has ill 
served the objective of preventing domestic terror.”228 Hence, for the pragmatic 
reason of efficiency, because the U.S. military already takes the lead in the war 
on terror internationally, its expertise and resources should be taken advantage 
of in our fight against terrorism domestically. After 9/11, both the CIA and the 
FBI were criticized because of the wall separating domestic and foreign intelli-
gence, a natural byproduct of differentiated departments until that point.229 How-
ever, if the military is tapped for service, there would be no such wall, because it 
is, essentially, one entity with communication lines running throughout to the 
command structure at the top. 
Moreover, many Americans are and should be uncomfortable with their lo-
cal police department becoming “SWATized,” because police cannot serve both 
roles well.230 Thus, an argument can be made that when it comes to combatting 
terrorism—where a “military-like” response is needed—the military should be 
the force that responds. 
4. Trading Military Soldiers for Police Soldiers  
The phrase “police militarization” has gained significant attention in recent 
years. But what, really, is the risk of police donning military uniforms and equip-
ping themselves with military grade weapons? We need only look at the case of 
Jose Guerena for the answer. On the morning of May 5, 2011, a S.W.A.T. team 
from the Pima County, Arizona, Sheriff’s Department raided a U.S. Marine vet-
eran who served two tours of duty in Iraq, to serve a search warrant for narcot-
ics.231 When his wife woke him up saying she saw a man outside with a gun, 
Guerena grabbed his rifle and told his wife to hide in the closet with their four-
year-old son as he went to reconnoiter and protect his home and family.232 The 
                                                        
227  See Tom A. Gizzo & Tama S. Monoson, A Call to Arms: The Posse Comitatus Act and the 
Use of the Military in the Struggle Against International Terrorism, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV. 
149, 162 (2003); Ligatti, supra note 222. 
228  Ligatti, supra note 222 (quoting Feldman, supra note 31, at 482). 
229  David Johnston, 9/11 Congressional Report Faults F.B.I.-C.I.A. Lapses, N.Y. TIMES (July 
24, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/24/us/9-11-congressional-report-faults-fbi-cia-
lapses.html. 
230  See Bennett, supra note 24, at 942–43. 
231  See Jose Guerena’s Family Gets Settlement, But His Killers Still Wear Badges, POLICE ST. 
USA (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.policestateusa.com/2013/jose-guerena-settlement 
[https://perma.cc/5SHX-MV3N] [hereinafter POLICE ST. USA]; see also Rizer & Hartman, su-
pra note 6. 
232  POLICE ST. USA, supra note 230; Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6. 
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Pima County S.W.A.T., which supports a population of less than a million peo-
ple, shot seventy-one rounds, hitting Guerena sixty times.233 “A subsequent in-
vestigation revealed that the initial shot that prompted the S.W.A.T. team barrage 
came from a S.W.A.T. team gun, not Guerena’s.”234 Reports later revealed that 
Guerena had no criminal record, and no narcotics were found at his home; fur-
ther, the safety on his weapon was on when he was shot.235 
The United States has witnessed a “proliferation in incidents of excessive, 
military-style force by police S.W.A.T. teams, which often make national head-
lines due to their sheer brutality.”236 Indeed, the increase of S.W.A.T. raids and 
callouts from 1980 to 2000 could be as high as 1400 percent.237 Even with stand-
ard police equipment, the availability of special equipment and training to offic-
ers seems to exacerbate the problem. Thus, it is important to take a look at the 
weapons police officers are now using on the streets of American communities, 
including those America saw live on the streets of Ferguson.  
It appears that law enforcement’s weapon of choice in Ferguson was the 
M4.238 The M4 is a carbine (shorter) version of the well-known M16 assault ri-
fle.239 The weapon has a rate of fire of 700–950 rounds per minute and became 
popular in the military when the U.S. Special Operations Command adopted the 
weapon as its universal rifle.240 The maximum effective range of the M4 is 
around 500 meters (1,640 feet), meaning that a trained shooter could, without a 
scope, hit a human-sized target at that distance.241 More relevant to the conver-
sation about police weapons is the M4’s maximum lethal range of 3,600 meters 
                                                        
233  POLICE ST. USA, supra note 230; Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6; Pima County, Arizona 
(AZ), CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/county/Pima_County-AZ.html [https://per 
ma.cc/ZPG9-PB5X] (last visited Nov. 28, 2015). 
234  Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6. 
235  POLICE ST. USA, supra note 230. 
236  Rizer & Hartman, supra note 6; Louis Jacobson, In Segment on Ferguson, John Oliver 
Says SWAT Raids Are Up 1,400 Percent, POLITIFACT: PUNDIT FACT (Aug. 18, 2014, 5:12 PM), 
http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/aug/18/john-oliver/segment-ferguson-
john-oliver-says-swat-raids-are-1 [https://perma.cc/KZ73-YJDE]. 
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238  See Niraj Chokshi, Militarized Police in Ferguson Unsettles Some; Pentagon Gives Cities 
Equipment, WASH. POST. (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/milita 
rized-police-in-ferguson-unsettles-some-pentagon-gives-cities-equip-
ment/2014/08/14/4651f670-2401-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/ALE5-5RP6] (stating that officers were deployed with M4 rifles like those 
used by forces in Iraq and Afghanistan); Richard Cosgrove, Ferguson Shooting: Missouri 
SWAT Teams Armed with M4 Assault Rifles, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014, 4:59 PM), 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ferguson-shooting-missouri-swat-teams-armed-m4-assault-rifles-
1461507 [https://perma.cc/4URG-VB6J]. 
239  See Colt M4 and M4A1 Carbine/Assault Rifles (USA), WORLD GUNS, 
http://world.guns.ru/assault/usa/m4-m4a1-e.html [https://perma.cc/89D8-9K5J] (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2015). 
240  Id. 
241  See M4—5.56mm Semiautomatic Rifle, ARMY STUDY GUIDE, http://www.armystudy-
guide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/m4/m4-study-guide.shtml [https://perm 
a.cc/J7RB-TS4U] (last visited Nov. 28, 2015) [hereinafter ARMY STUDY GUIDE]. 
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(11,811 feet).242 Thus, if an officer fires at a target and misses, a bystander over 
a mile and a half away could be hit.243 In addition, with a muzzle velocity of 
2,970 feet per second, the 5.56 mm round that is fired by the M4 has significant 
penetration power,244 meaning that a single round can go through—and, while I 
was in the Army, I heard stories of rounds going through—multiple people. This 
is not to mention the devastating effect of the 5.56 mm round itself, which is 
designed to tumble when it hits its target, leaving horrific internal wounds due to 
its relatively light weight and tendency to flip around and bounce off of bones.245 
What do all of these numbers mean? First, they show that the M4 is a very 
effective weapon for a soldier in combat to maim and kill, a truth that applies 
equally to certain, specialized missions within a police department. Second, they 
reveal that the M4 is a particularly clumsy weapon for a police officer to use 
when surrounded by a mass of civilians who are frustrated at what they perceive 
as police abuse.246 To fully understand this, one has to keep in mind that a police 
officer is not permitted to use deadly force unless the “officer has probable cause 
to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical 
injury to the officer or others.”247 Thus, an officer may use deadly force only in 
self-defense or in defense of others against a particular suspect in a particular set 
of circumstances.248 The M4 assault rifle, by its very nature, is designed to en-
gage and destroy the enemy at long range.249 It is a good offensive weapon, but a 
poor choice for crowd control; it is unwieldy, long-range, and carries the poten-
tial for over-penetration.250  
Another “tool,” the MRAP, is not a “tank,” but in the eyes of most civilians, 
it closely resembles one. This adds to the perception of a warlike atmosphere 
when local police departments deploy them for simple crowd control pur-
poses.251 Rather than calming emotions and helping protesters to engage in ra-
tional, constitutionally protected protest against perceived injustice, the MRAP 
instead simply heightens community members’ feelings that their neighborhood 
is being invaded and oppressed. 
                                                        
242  See id. 
243  See id. 
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So why do police departments issue ordinary police officers M4 assault rifles 
in cities like Ferguson, Missouri? That is simple: they look scary, and police—
thanks to the 1033 Program—have them readily at hand.252 It is likely the same 
reason that many of the officers we see in the pictures are wearing green fatigues 
(the same fatigues issued to Unites States Marines)—it makes them look like 
soldiers and, in the public’s eyes, soldiers play by different rules. To make that 
intention more obvious, it should be noted that the color green does not provide 
particularly effective camouflage in an urban environment. Instead of assisting 
the main goal of crowd control—to calm a mob of angry people—this image is 
more likely to cause fear of and hostility toward the authorities. It might accom-
plish the immediate objective of dispersing a mob; or it could enrage a crowd 
into a violent frenzy; or, more likely, it could plant the seeds for discontent for 
future interactions. Such discontent would likely be sewn with even more violent 
dissent, of the type seen in Ferguson, and, potentially, may lead to the distrust of 
future generations with a learned antipathy for the police. 
It is particularly ironic that the use of the very tools acquired from the DOD’s 
1033 Program, which were intended to equip local communities to handle their 
own problems without needing to call in the larger state or federal support, have 
frequently created situations demanding state and federal intervention. Accord-
ing to the DOD, the 1033 Program was intended to allow “all law enforcement 
agencies to acquire property for bona fide law enforcement purposes that assist 
in their arrest and apprehension mission.”253 If Ferguson is any indication, how-
ever, local law enforcement agencies apparently cannot be trusted to distinguish 
between a dangerous “arrest and apprehension mission” and basic crowd control 
of a largely peaceful protest. Due to the Ferguson Police Department’s obvious 
failures following the first night of protest, the situation spiraled completely out 
of control—Governor Jay Nixon requested the assistance of the Missouri State 
Highway Patrol and called in the Missouri National Guard, just as he later did in 
the days leading up to the grand jury decision.254 In response, Attorney General 
Holder went to meet with community leaders and attempt to ratchet down the 
tension and the Department of Justice launched an investigation into the police 
department’s mishandling of events.255 Even the Pentagon is now reassessing the 
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17, 2014, 3:53 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ferguson-national-guard-called-in-ahead-
of-grand-jury-decision [https://perma.cc/244Q-GVTH]. 
255  See, e.g., Stephanie Condon, Eric Holder Heads to Ferguson with a Clear Message, CBS 
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wisdom of the 1033 Program.256 In short, if the goal of the program was to equip 
local police forces to handle matters themselves, it has obviously backfired, rais-
ing again the question of what such hardware is doing in the hands of small-town, 
community police forces in the first place.257 
The success or failure of a program such as this is judged by the total effect 
of its impact on society. By that standard, the 1033 program has failed in many 
respects: It has severely negative effects upon the police by creating and rein-
forcing an “us versus them” and “occupying soldier” mentality on either side; it 
often engenders hatred and fear within the portion of the population exposed to 
its weapons and corresponding tactics; and its main goal of quelling unrest is 
inverted, because, while temporarily dispersing a crowd, it sows the seeds for 
more and more violent clashes in the future. It is hard to see how this program is 
accomplishing anything of value in the quest to have a safe, contented, and 
peaceful populace. Given the events in Ferguson, it is well past the time for a 
national conversation on the problems associated with the militarization of 
American police departments.  
The Posse Comitatus Act was designed to prevent use of the military for 
domestic law enforcement. Perhaps it has been too effective, for the loss of this 
capability and rising threats (real or perceived) has led to “innovative” programs 
and the twisting of peace officers into quasi-military units that perhaps make the 
“cure” worse than the “disease.” 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: UPDATING AND MODIFYING  
THE LAW FOR TODAY’S AMERICA 
The Supreme Court has said that “while the Constitution protects against 
invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.”258 President Lincoln ech-
oed this notion with the opinion that “it is better to violate the Constitution than 
to allow the destruction of the nation.”259 Indeed, as one scholar noted, “Both 
contemporary and traditional teachings of democratic political theory emphasize 
that the abandonment of the processes of democracy is one of the first essential 
steps in responding to an emergency.”260 
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The history of the United States is filled with collisions between liberty and 
security, and often, though not invariably, these collisions have resulted in the 
acquiescence to government intrusions for the cause of safety.261 Knowing this 
history, it is important to strike a balance to ensure liberties are protected where 
possible; here, that means maintaining a distinction between the roles of the po-
lice and the military. With that said, the U.S. military is the predominant player 
in the war on terror internationally and has immense assets that can help during 
other domestic emergencies. Should it make a difference just where they are 
fighting the war? In England, for example, when a national security threat be-
comes domestic, it is the SAS (the Special Air Service—the British equivalent 
of America’s Delta Force), not Scotland Yard, that will in all likelihood re-
spond.262 When faced with a grave threat, a nation should use its resources most 
effectively and should use whatever it has to its greatest capability. In responding 
to terrorist threats, that is undoubtedly the military. If a victim of a crime was in 
the fight for her life and her assailant had a knife, but she carried both a knife 
and a gun, it would not be reasonable to expect her to limit herself to using a 
knife based on principle alone. The United States finds itself, domestically, in a 
fight for American lives, and it too should choose the gun over the knife when 
fighting terrorists.  
This Article proffers three simple updates to the Posse Comitatus Act that 
would protect civil liberties and maintain the American tradition of harboring 
suspicions of our own government. 
A. Make It More Clear 
Despite what many believe, the American ban on Posse Comitatus is merely 
a law, not a constitutional construct or amendment.263 Therefore, it can easily be 
changed. While it is impossible to know if more military involvement would 
make America safer,264 it is likely that the Posse Comitatus Act and its underly-
ing jurisprudence is not the epitome of what a law should be: something that 
enhances and protects American liberties and security.  
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The confusion surrounding the Posse Comitatus Act is, at least in part, due 
to the failure of the Supreme Court to provide meaningful decisions and clarify 
the different points of law. It is amazing that a statute of such importance that 
has been on the books for 130 years has only been cited before the Supreme 
Court a handful of times and deliberated upon only once in a meaningful way.265 
Instead, lower courts have engaged in sidelong discussions about whether the 
military was enforcing criminal laws or not.266 In order to make sense of the Act, 
and without meaningful input from the courts, the DOD has promulgated internal 
regulations.267 The result is a situation where the proponents of the Act argue that 
there are so many cross cutting laws that allow the government to deploy troops 
in almost any circumstance, that change is not needed. Yet, this hodgepodge ap-
proach denies the very thing that it admits—it is a confusing area of law that 
needs to be addressed and made clearer.268 
Accordingly, both policy makers and the military do not clearly understand 
the Act’s boundaries. In turn, the maximum effect of military resources cannot 
be utilized and civil liberties cannot be maximally protected.269 At a bare mini-
mum, the Posse Comitatus Act needs to be updated to eliminate the paralysis it 
causes though overlapping and contradictory laws and regulations. Indeed, even 
if no provisions are changed, Congress should pass a comprehensive Posse 
Comitatus Act that, at a minimum, combines the current jurisprudence into a 
uniform, comprehensible statute. 
B. Lower the Echelon of Authority 
The Homeland Security Act makes it clear that the Posse Comitatus Act does 
not apply to the President in the sense that it does not prevent him from deploying 
troops in a domestic emergency.270 However, lesser officers—importantly, those 
that actually run the agencies charged with defending this nation—do not enjoy 
the authority to use the military, except as provided for by Congress in the ex-
ceptions and omissions discussed above. 
“As interpretations of the Posse Comitatus Act currently stand, the Presi-
dent’s ability to make rapid decisions is hampered [by] the complex statutory 
web . . . .”271 One potential solution is to streamline the decision-making process 
regarding when and how the military can be used in an emergency.272 As noted 
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on this subject, “The concept of a centralized chain of command with the Presi-
dent as commander-in-chief is the very structure utilized by the military . . . [and] 
allows one person to make and direct decisions regarding the deployment and 
use of American military forces worldwide.”273 This model is of great benefit 
during wartime, resulting in swift and decisive action due to the potential tactical 
responses that have already been considered and prepped.274 However, during 
domestic emergencies, this model often produces different results due to the in-
evitable lag time from event to gathering information to response.275 
Therefore, local authorities should be given more control over the military 
when it is necessary and appropriate to use the military in a law enforcement 
capacity. Local mayors and police chiefs are much more attuned to the commu-
nity’s needs during an emergency than the President of the United States. More-
over, when decisions are made in the stratosphere of the national political arena, 
it is likely that politics will play a role in every aspect of the decision on whether 
to deploy federal troops, as seen during Hurricane Katrina.276 
Admittedly a local mayor cannot and should not be given carte blanche au-
thority over a military unit; the President, as the Commander-in-Chief, has the 
ultimate authority over the armed forces and their deployment. However, for lim-
ited periods of time—during emergencies, for example—local authorities should 
have more of an ability to obtain and direct the assistance of military personnel 
and equipment in a law enforcement capacity. The ability to grant that request 
should be found somewhere lower in the command echelon than the level of the 
President, but remain subject to review. It is unreasonable that if local authorities 
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need the military to serve in a law enforcement role, the President has to hear the 
request, gather the appropriate information, and make a decision affecting local 
events far removed from the national and international scenes in which the Pres-
ident is generally active.  
C. Rely on Timelines Rather than Absolute Bans 
A key change to the Posse Comitatus Act should be to increase the military’s 
ability to deploy domestically in a law enforcement capacity to increase security 
during an emergency.277 At the same time, in order to protect civil liberties and 
to limit the power of government, this new power should be time-restricted and 
subject to review. 
This new law would streamline the speed with which units could deploy be-
cause they would not first have to ask to what extent they could help. Rather, 
they could simply act, but only for a specified period of time. This ability to have 
direct law enforcement authority would provide the country with the “best bang 
for its buck.” For instance, the U.S. Army Military Police Corps has soldiers who 
are already trained as police officers.278 With that in mind, does it make sense 
that in emergencies, these military police officers cannot conduct law enforce-
ment missions? 
The obvious question that arises from this proposed approach is, How much 
time? A bright line rule of, for example, 30 days, would be adequate for emer-
gencies such as the WTO riots in Seattle.279 However, events such as 9/11 and 
Katrina would require significantly more support and more time. 
There are a number of ways to correct this problem. First, the timeline could 
be a sliding scale where thirty days would be routinely approved by a reviewing 
body, but where any increase beyond those thirty days would require approval at 
some level, probably with the President himself or his designee. Another solution 
could be for Congress to affect the policy with its power of the purse, by discon-
tinuing funding for the deployment. 
The fact that there will be challenges to this new approach does not mean 
that it should not be attempted. Indeed, this approach best suits the proponents 
of the Posse Comitatus Act by limiting the military’s ability to act as police of-
ficers for a quantifiable period time, as well as placating the opponents of the Act 
by allowing the military to fully deploy without any confusion about their obli-
gations or limitations. 
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D. Sometimes a Hammer Is Needed 
In an effort to remedy their relative inadequacy in dealing with terrorism on 
U.S. soil and the ever-increasing violence posed by organized crime and drug 
trafficking, police forces throughout the country have obtained military equip-
ment, adopted military training, and sought to inculcate a “soldier’s mentality” 
among its ranks.280 Though the reasons for this growth in the militarization of 
American police forces seem obvious, as discussed throughout this Article, the 
dangerous side effects are somewhat less apparent.281 
American police departments have substantially increased their use of mili-
tary-grade equipment and weaponry because there is a real need in specific areas. 
The logic behind this is understandable. If superior, military-grade equipment 
helps the police avert or reduce the threat of a domestic terror attack and reduce 
crime, then some would argue that the ends justify the means. Yet, as discussed, 
blurring the line between cops and soldiers raises serious concerns and, as seen 
for people like Jose Guerena, poses very real consequences.282 This is especially 
true in cases where police departments have employed their newly acquired mil-
itary weaponry, not only to combat terrorism and heavily armed criminals, but 
also for everyday patrolling and controlling those they are charged to serve and 
protect.283  
However, this reality unfolds along a continuum. The adage, “you give 
someone a hammer, and everything looks like a nail” brings into focus the danger 
of equipping police like soldiers. But that adage fails to contemplate the other 
end of the scale: sometimes there are nails in the world that need to be hit—and 
“neutralized.” On what should be those rare occasions when law enforcement 
needs a direct action response, there should be an exception to the Posse Comi-
tatus Act to allow law enforcement authorities or the responsible executive offi-
cial to call in military assistance to act as the proverbial “hammer.” The benefit 
of this approach is that a military unit, with its military “mindset,” can be de-
ployed for a specific mission and for a specific amount of time, and then can be 
recalled to the base and barracks. This would honor our forebears design for a 
distinct separation of military and policing functions, while allowing the flexi-
bility needed to effectively respond to emergencies too large for police forces to 
handle, even with the 1033 Program’s “help.”  
Under the current model, because most members of S.W.A.T. teams are also 
“everyday” police officers, after the team members deploy for a military-type 
mission, they return to the streets as beat cops. Yet they return equipped their 
military training, mentality, and oftentimes weaponry.284 This poses real dangers 
to the citizens of the communities to which these cops return. 
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It is fully acknowledged that the solution proposed by this Article is not a 
perfect solution. Indeed, often police cannot wait for a military direct-action team 
from a remote base. Sometimes police need to act now and with force. In those 
cases, when there may not be time to call in military forces, a local S.W.A.T. 
team can be called in, again, to respond to a particular situation for the duration 
of the emergency. For less-localized or larger-scale emergencies, all police 
should not be turned into S.W.A.T. teams to calm the waters and respond—they 
simply are not equipped to be both police and soldier. Rather, a unit much better 
equipped to handle such situations should be called in and effectively used, then 
withdrawn, so the community police forces can retake control of their own 
streets. 
CONCLUSION 
The Revolutionary and Civil Wars have left their impressions on the Amer-
ican psyche. Americans are taught this history from young ages and are thus 
taught early on to at least appreciate that government can go too far, and that 
soldiers on our domestic soil are to be regarded with mistrust. After September 
11, 2001, however, Americans were faced with a present reality much different 
than the history they grew up learning. The American view of the military’s role 
has changed. The Department of Homeland Security was created, in part, to draw 
disparate lines of communication between defense and intelligence agencies to-
gether.285 Where once the FBI held its secrets close to its chest, today those walls 
have been torn down and information is shared freely.286 Today, it is easy to see 
why the military’s ample and sophisticated resources should be used most effec-
tively where they will be best utilized, across government agencies.  
Nonetheless, many Americans have grown anxious about the balance be-
tween security and liberty. Some believe that the government is trespassing on 
sacred limitations, particularly with regard to the military’s new role as a law 
enforcement agency.287 Others argue that the government is still not doing 
enough to protect lives and that the Posse Comitatus Act obstructs the govern-
ment’s ability to deploy its great resources in the most efficient and effective 
way. This argument was bolstered after the unimpressive (to say the least) re-
sponse to Hurricane Katrina. Federal leaders were faulted both for their ineffec-
tive use of resources and because they demonstrated that they simply did not 
understand what limits the Posse Comitatus Act actually imposed on their ability 
to act. Furthermore, there is a real need for limited military tactics in the domestic 
sphere, and because of the mission creep seen in the work-arounds to the Posse 
                                                        
285  See Information Sharing, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/topic/infor 
mation-sharing [https://perma.cc/N3E3-C3SU] (last visited Nov. 28, 2015). 
286  See id. 
287  See supra Part III.A. 
16 NEV. L.J. 467 RIZER - FINAL.DOCX 3/31/2016  8:26 AM 
512 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:467  
Comitatus ban, police departments are encouraged to take up soldiering. In es-
sence, this police militarization has made the Posse Comitatus, in every practical 
sense, irrelevant.  
Because of these countervailing positions—maintain or repeal—a middle-
ground approach may be the most realistic option. Not only is a middle ground 
likely the only feasible political option, such an approach will also improve the 
government’s ability to respond. First, the Posse Comitatus Act should be 
amended to synthesize the mishmash of laws and regulations into one uniform 
policy that is clear and easily understood by both political and military leaders. 
Second, because the local authorities in an emergency will have the best under-
standing of the needs of the community, the ability to deploy troops for law en-
forcement purposes should not be limited to the President, who has a “top of the 
mountain” view of emergencies, when a “deep in the forest” view is what is truly 
necessary. Local authorities should have greater access to military help and lower 
echelon government leaders should have the authority to deploy troops for lim-
ited law enforcement missions. In addition, the Act should be amended to repeal 
the bright line rule that prevents the military from serving in a law enforcement 
capacity—after all, the line turns out to be not so bright upon inspection, as 
demonstrated by this Article. Instead, the primary limitation on military involve-
ment should be based on the time such involvement is allowed. Further, that in-
volvement should, of course, be subject to review by those who traditionally have 
authority over the use of the military. This would reduce fears of a “military 
coup” and the unease that Americans are taught to feel toward soldiers patrolling 
neighborhood streets. At the same time, it would allow the military to use its vast 
resources during a time of dire need. Lastly, in order to reduce police soldiering, 
we should allow military direct action in the rare and limited circumstances 
where the ground truth dictates that we require a fast and violent response—a 
hammer. In turn, this should reduce the need for police departments to train and 
equip their officers in military fashion, just in case that hammer stroke becomes 
required in their communities. 
It has been argued that the greatest threat to our democracy may be the belief 
that our system of laws and the Constitution are keeping the U.S. government 
from adequately protecting its citizens.288  
The stakes are more than individual preservation. If Americans believe that 
the “great experiment” of democracy is something worth fighting for, and if we 
are dedicated to the concepts that have historically defined who we are as a peo-
ple—a free people—then certainly we should be just as dedicated to ensuring the 
security of those people.289 Thus, a cost-benefit analysis must be applied in any 
security versus freedom debate. We must weigh the liberties we hold dear against 
the safety of our people, our communities, and our nation. In striking that bal-
ance, it may be necessary to provide for a true hammer—the military—to be used 
                                                        
288  See Tkacz, supra note 146, at 332–33. 
289  See id. 
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in those cases that require such a response in order to protect against inappropri-
ate or disproportionate means from being used too often by militarized police 
forces. 
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